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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The eﬀects of globalization on domestic economies have been, and still are, widely
debated. In this thesis I contribute to the literature on the eﬀects of international trade on
labor market outcomes. In the first chapter I review the more recent work on the subject
and notice how the use of datasets that contain data on individual workers is promising for
advancing the field. In the second chapter I combine micro level data on U.S. workers from
the March Current Population Survey in the 1980s with macro level data on trade for the
industries the workers are in. In particular, I focus on trade in intermediate inputs, that I call
oﬀshoring. Oﬀshoring in U.S. manufacturing grew more than 25% between 1970 and 1990
(Hummels et al. (2001)). I find an eﬀect of oﬀshoring on the wage premium paid to educated
workers with respect to less educated ones. This skill-premium is an important component
of wage inequality. In the third chapter, I study if oﬀshoring has also aﬀected residual
inequality, i.e. the wage inequality that is not explained by basic observable characteristics
of the worker. In order to do this, I study if oﬀshoring has aﬀected the workers’ probability of
switching their occupations. Previous studies have found that the increase in occupational
switching accounts for a large portion of the increase in residual inequality. I find however
that oﬀshoring does not aﬀect occupational switching. Taken together, my results imply
that, at least for U.S. in the 1980s, oﬀshoring increased wage inequality by increasing the
skill-premium but did not aﬀect residual wage inequality.
More specifically, the first chapter surveys recent empirical works that study the
eﬀects of trade on labor market outcomes. The focus is on studies that use individual
workers’ data. These data allow to control for the changing variation of the labor force
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across industries over time. In this regard, these studies improve over previous ones that
do not control for worker level variables. I first review works that are based on regressions.
These works find that, at least for the U.S., trade either increases wage inequality or has no
eﬀect on it. I discuss the reasons that may explain the variety of these results. These results
seem to suggest that, at least for the U.S., the increase in trade did not benefit the poorest
among the workers. This is in line to what Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) find in their review
of studies on developing countries. I then review empirical works based on structural models.
These models suggest instead that studies based on wage regressions neglect the long-term
consequences of trade on the reallocation of resources across sectors and the eﬃciency gains
associated with it. I finally show the usefulness of matched employer-employee datasets and
discuss along the way promising avenues for future research.
In recent decades many countries have experienced an increase in both interna-
tional trade and the skill-premium. The association between these two phenomena has
proven elusive in the early empirical literature on the subject. Indeed, the consensus among
labor economists seems to be that trade has not been the main cause of such increase in
the skill-premium. This view has been challenged by Feenstra and Hanson (1999) who find
that oﬀshoring sizably aﬀects the skill-premium. In the second chapter I revisit this debate
using individual workers data from the March Current Population Survey combined with
industry-level trade data. This strategy improves upon the work of Feenstra and Hanson
who do not control for the demographic characteristics of the labor force. I show that
industry-level wage regressions overestimate the impact of oﬀshoring on the skill-premium
if the demographic characteristics of the labor force are omitted. In addition, I find that
oﬀshoring increases the relative employment of skilled workers, thus suggesting that oﬀ-
shoring has played an important role in the increase in the skill-premium by increasing the
2
economy-wide relative demand of skilled workers.
Various studies have stressed the importance of an increase in economic turbulence
for the understanding of the labor market. Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b) document
an increase in the fraction of workers switching occupations since the early 1970s to the
mid-1990s. They show how this increase is able to explain a substantial portion of the
concurrent increase in residual wage inequality. They attribute the increase in occupational
switching to the increased turbulence in the economy. Oﬀshoring seems to be a possible
candidate for the increase of turbulence in the labor market. In the third chapter, using data
from the March Current Population Survey for the 1983-1990 period, I study if oﬀshoring
in manufacturing is correlated with occupational switching. I find that oﬀshoring does not
increase the probability of switching occupations. The coeﬃcient on oﬀshoring is either
non-significantly diﬀerent from zero or significantly diﬀerent from zero and negative. This
result is robust to the use of diﬀerent measures of oﬀshoring and to controlling for attrition
out of the March Current Population Survey from one year to the other. This result suggests
that oﬀshoring from U.S. to abroad has not been responsible for the increase in residual
inequality.
3
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
Recently, the impact of international trade on labor market outcomes has received
a great deal of attention in the press.1 At the same time, the academic literature has devoted
an increasing attention to the impact of international trade on labor market outcomes. In
particular, many studies have combined data on individual workers with industry level data
to study e.g. the impact of trade on inequality, on the wages of the unskilled workers and
on unemployment. The goal of this paper is to survey the recent empirical literature in this
area and to point to promising avenues for future research.
Some clarifications are in order here. First, this is not a survey of the theoretical
literature on trade and the labor market. I will refer to that literature when relevant but
the focus here is on the empirical work, its challenges and results. Second, this is not even
a survey of all the empirical literature on the subject. Indeed, I concentrate on studies that
make use of individual level data on workers.2 There is for example a large literature in the
1990s about the eﬀect of trade on wage inequality but that literature mainly uses data on
workers that is aggregated at the industry level.3 Again, I will refer to this literature when
relevant but the focus here is on empirical studies that use individual data on workers.
1Irwin (2009) and Wolf (2004) detail the various policy debates concerning “globalization”. Amiti et al.
(2005) document the importance of service oﬀshoring during the 2004 U.S. presidential election.
2A bit of historical perspective may be helpful. One of the most significant development in the recent
trade literature is the use, especially since the end of the 90s, of micro level data on firms or plants. A
subsequent development has been the use of micro level data on workers, which is the focus of this survey.
These two approaches are now being combined in the use of employer-employee matched datasets. In section
II.4.3 I review Muendler and Menezes-Filho (2007) who utilize a employer-employee matched dataset.
3This literature is reviewed in e.g. Acemoglu (2002, Section 6.3).
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Even this narrow focus does not allow me to review all the more recent papers in the
literature given their increasing number. Rather my survey is only selective with the intent
to delineate some of the main features and challenges of the work in this area.
In the study of the impact of trade on the labor market, the usefulness of individual
data on workers can be illustrated in several ways. First, we know that a worker’s wage is
aﬀected by her observable individual characteristics. Studies that rely only on aggregate
wages at the industry level and do not control for the individual characteristics of the
workers within each industry omit an important determinant of the level of wages in each
industry.4 If the characteristics of the workers are correlated with the trade regressor of
interest, the empirical results will be biased. Including industry fixed eﬀects in the regression
(or diﬀerencing over time within an industry) alleviates this problem only in part because
trade may also involve a changing composition of the labor force within an industry over
time. Moreover, even if the characteristics of workers were not correlated with the regressors
of interest, their inclusion in the wage regression will likely decrease the standard errors on
the estimates on the relevant regressors.
A worker’s wage is also aﬀected by her unobservable individual characteristics. If
workers sort across industries based on these unobservable characteristics, then the estimates
of the parameters of interest may be biased. Using longitudinal individual worker’s level data
also allows to control for worker fixed eﬀects. It also also allows the study of other relevant
outcomes. For example, one can observe the movement of workers across industries, across
occupations and across labor market status (e.g. employed in the formal sector, employed
in the informal sector, unemployed).
4The same is true of studies that use data on workers that is aggregated at the firm or plant level without
controlling for the individual characteristics of the workers within each firm or plant.
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Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) review the literature on the distributional eﬀects of
globalization in developing countries. This survey is diﬀerent from theirs in the following
ways. First, the focus of this survey is on studies that utilize individual worker’s data.
While their paper also reviews some of such studies, this paper updates theirs focusing on
more recent developments in this area. Second, many studies that utilize individual worker’s
data refer to the U.S. experience. Because of this focus I review many papers that study
the U.S. labor market and not the developing countries’ one. Finally, I use the Mincerian
equation to organize the exposition of the material and, to the best of my knowledge, my
paper is the first to do that. But some distinctions in the literature are standard (e.g. the
distinction between inter-sectoral vs. intra-sectoral reallocation of resources) and Goldberg
and Pavcnik (2007) articulate them in an excellent way: I therefore follow their work in
some regards and I document when I do so. Another related work is Crino` (2009). He
focuses on the labor market eﬀect of oﬀshoring of services, oﬀshoring of manufacturing and
foreign direct investment. He reviews only few studies that use individual worker’s data
and none that uses a structural model. He also does not survey the more recent literature
on the labor market eﬀects of trade in final goods while I do not survey the literature on the
international movement of capital. In this sense, our two surveys are then complementary.
Section II.2 reviews the stylized facts for the labor market and for trade flows that
motivate the works in this area. Section II.3 reviews the methodologies that are usually
utilized in the literature, with a special focus on Mincerian wage regressions. Section II.4.1
reviews the results on the eﬀects of trade on the wage premium paid to skilled workers
with respect to unskilled workers. Section II.4.2 reviews the results on the eﬀects of trade
on other components of wage inequality. The studies reviewed in these sections use wage
regressions and find that, at least for U.S., trade either increases wage inequality or has no
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eﬀect on it. The reasons that may explain the variety of these results are discussed in section
II.3. From these results one could be tempted to conclude that the increase in trade did not
benefit the poorest among the U.S. workers. This would be in line to what Goldberg and
Pavcnik (2007) find in their review of studies on developing countries. However, structural
models suggest that studies based on wage regressions neglect the long-term consequences
of trade on the reallocation of resources across sectors and the eﬃciency gains associated
with it. These studies are reviewed in section II.4.3. This section also reviews a study that
uses matched employer-employee data and shows the advantages of using such data. Table
1 contains an overview of the results. Section II.5 concludes.
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Table 1. Literature Review: Summary
Study Country Methodology Dataset Results
Period N
Feenstra and Hanson (1999) U.S. Two-stage regression Industry Panel Oﬀshoring accounts for at least
1979-1987 450 15% of increase in skill-premium
Lovely and Richardson (2000) U.S. OLS with individual Worker Panel (PSID) Trade with newly industrialized countries
1981-1992 fixed eﬀects 6,477 does not increase the industry premium to
skilled relatively to unskilled workers
Kosteas (2008) U.S. OLS with individual Worker Panel (NLSY) Wage semi-elasticity w.r.t. imports share
1979-1996 fixed eﬀects N/A from low-wage countries is -.6
Ebenstein et al. (2009) U.S. OLS Worker Cross-section Wage semi-elasticity w.r.t. import share
1983-2002 (CPS MORG) at occupation level is -.27
2,505,724
Liu and Trefler (2008) U.S. First Diﬀerences Worker Cross-Section Oﬀshoring of services does not
1996-2005 (Matched March CPS) significantly aﬀect wages
37,550
Attanasio et al. (2004) Colombia First Diﬀerences Worker Cross-Section Wage semi-elasticity w.r.t. tariﬀs
1984-1998 (Household Survey) is 0.05
225202
Source: compilation of the author.
8
Table 2. Literature Review: Summary, continued
Study Country Methodology Dataset Results
Period N
Artuc et al. (2010) U.S. Structural Estimation Worker Cross-Section Workers in the import-competing sector
1975-2000 (March CPS) sector may benefit from a lower tariﬀ
N/A because of higher option value of moving
to another sector
Artuc (2009) U.S. Structural Estimation Worker Panel (NLSY) Middle-aged workers in the import-competing
1983-1994 1190 sector are hurt the most by a lower tariﬀ
because of industry-specific human capital
Muendler et al. (2007) Brazil Logit with Matched Employer- After trade liberalization, job separations
1990-1998 individual fixed eﬀects Employee, 1% random are higher, and job accessions are lower,
sample from population in comparative-advantage sectors
and at exporters.
Source: compilation of the author.9
Empirical Motivation
Labor Market Outcomes
A large literature has documented the changes in the labor market in recent
decades, in both developing and developed countries. Figure 1 graphs the employment
of production workers in U.S. manufacturing during the 1972-1996 period. Even though
the U.S. population increased during this period, the number of production workers em-
ployed in U.S. manufacturing declined by almost 1,400,000.5 Using data from the Current
Population Survey (CPS hereafter), Ebenstein et al. (2009) estimate a decrease in total
employment in U.S. manufacturing from 22 millions in 1979 to 17 millions in 2002, with
a rapid decrease in the more recent years. A possible explanation for this decline is that
the price of foreign manufacturing goods has decreased relatively to the price of domes-
tic manufacturing goods and so the U.S. consumers have substituted away from domestic
manufacturing.
Several studies have also documented the changes in the wage structure in U.S.
and in other countries. In this regard it is useful to introduce the Mincerian wage equation
that has been used extensively in the labor literature. A popular version of this equation is
the following:
ln(ws) = α+ β1Races + β2Genders + β3Exps + β4Exp
2
s + β5Educs + ￿s (II.1)
where s is a worker, ln is the natural logarithm, ws her wage, Races a set of race dummies,
Genders a gender dummy, Exps a proxy for work experience, Educs a measure of education
such as years of schooling or a set of dummies for degrees completed, and ￿s an error assumed
5Data are from the NBER productivity database. I graph the data since 1972 which is the earliest available
year for the trade data used in Figure 2. The number of total workers (production and non-production)
employed in U.S. manufacturing declined by around 700,000 during this period.
10
to be random.
If we measure inequality of wages with the variance, then this equation allows to
decompose wage inequality in two components: the variance of the predicted wage and the
variance of the estimated residual.6 The first term is also called between-inequality because
it captures that portion of wage inequality that depends on e.g. men earning on average
more than women. The second term is also called within-inequality because it captures
that portion of wage inequality that does not depend on the demographic characteristics
of workers. In other words, there is inequality of wages even among workers who have the
same demographic characteristics. This second term is also called residual inequality, which
is the term I will use in this review.
A remarkable change in the wage structure has been the increase in the wage
premium paid to educated workers. This is also called skill -premium under the assumption
that education is a good proxy of the skill of the worker.7 In terms of equation (II.1),
this means an increase in β5 over time.8 Autor et al. (2008, Figure 2, p.303) show that,
since 1979 to 2005, the average wage paid to a worker with a college degree grew 20%
more than the average wage paid to a worker with only a high-school degree. Given that
the relative employment of U.S. skilled workers has also increased, this suggests that the
relative demand for skilled workers has increased.9 Similar patterns for relative employment
and relative wages of skilled workers have also been detected in many developing countries,
6More specifically, the Mincerian equation allows to decompose the inequality of the log of wages. The
logarithm is useful for several reasons. First, it reduces the impact of very large incomes on the estimates.
Second, the distribution of the log of wages is fairly normal which is useful when using ordinary least squares.
Third, the use of logs facilitates the interpretation of the coeﬃcients that become either elasticities (if the
regressor is also in logs) or semi-elasticities. In what follows, when I talk about “wage” I actually mean the
log of wage.
7Some studies proxy unskilled workers with production workers and skilled workers with non-production
workers.
8Sometimes equation II.1 is run in diﬀerent years allowing the coeﬃcients to change over time.
9This point has been made several times in the literature. See for example Katz and Autor (1999),
Acemoglu (2002) and more recently Crino` (2009, p.203).
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especially since the 1980s.10 The increase in the skill-premium has also contributed to the
increase in overall wage inequality. In U.S. the wage of workers at the 90th percentile has
increased around 25% more than the wage of workers at the 10th percentile (see Autor et al.
(2008, Figure 2, p.303)).11 In Section II.4.1 I discuss the relationship between various forms
of international trade and the increase in the relative demand for skill.
The coeﬃcients on the other variables in equation II.1 have also changed over time,
at least for U.S, and contributed to the evolution of wage inequality over time.12 There are
only few works that discuss how international trade has aﬀected these coeﬃcients and so
this is possibly an area for future research.
Even if the vector of β coeﬃcients does not change, wage inequality may still
increase because of an increase in residual inequality. The evidence on residual inequality
is mixed. For the U.S. Katz and Autor (1999) at first estimated that the increase in
residual inequality could explain up to 2/3 of the increase in overall inequality. Kambourov
and Manovskii (2009b, Figure 1, p.736) use the PSID and find that the contribution of
the residual inequality to the increase in overall inequality is very large. Lemieux (2006)
argues instead that around 3/4 of the increase in residual inequality between 1973 and 2003
disappears when controlling for compositional eﬀects.13 Bertola and Ichino (1995, Figure
2) document that residual inequality was fairly stable in Great Britain, France and Italy
during the 70s and the 80s. Attanasio et al. (2004) document a sizable increase, albeit non-
10See the review in Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007, Table 1, p.48).
11Obviously, income inequality need not translate in consumption inequality. Early work found evidence
that consumption inequality also markedly increased in U.S. in the 1980s (Cutler and Katz (1992)). How-
ever, recent work that uses the Consumer Expenditure Survey has reconsidered this result showing that
consumption inequality has increased much more moderately than income inequality (Krueger and Perri
(2006)).
12See Katz and Autor (1999).
13In other words, the residual in equation (II.1) is heteroskedastic: the variance of the residual depends
on the specific combination of observable characteristics of the worker (e.g. older workers tend to have more
dispersed wages). Lemieux (2006) shows that a large part of the increase in the residual inequality can be
explained by the increase in the size of the combinations that have a higher variance of the residual (e.g.
the workforce getting older).
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monotonic, in residual inequality between 1984 and 1998 for Colombia. In section II.4.2 I
discuss the relationship between trade and residual inequality.
Trade Flows
The recent decades have also witnessed a remarkable increase in trade across coun-
tries. In Figure 2 I graph the import penetration in U.S. manufacturing for the 1972-1996
period. Import penetration was 7% in 1972 but it increased to 22% in 1996.14
In its 1998 annual report the WTO documents that, worldwide, “merchandise
exports grew by 6 per cent in real terms from 1948 to 1997, compared to an annual average
output growth of 3.7 per cent”(p.33). It also reports that “in developed countries, openness
measured by the ratio of trade to GDP increased from 16.6 to 24.1 per cent between 1985
and 1997. In developing countries this indicator rose from 22.8 per cent to 38.0 per cent
over the same period”(p.33). Finally they also report how the composition of trade has
been changing, moving away from agriculture to manufacturing, with the more recent rise
in trade in services.15
The academic literature has also focused on the specific forms in which trade can
take place. Many studies have documented how it is not just trade in final goods that has
increased but also trade in intermediate inputs, a phenomenon also referred to as oﬀshoring.
Crino` (2009, p.198) documents that oﬀshoring in manufacturing, measured as the share of
14The original data is from Bernard et al. (2006). This data is available at Peter Schott’s website. Import
penetration by SIC 87 industry is defined as imports/(shipments-exports+imports). Data is available for all
years for only 386 industries out of 459 SIC 87 industries. I take the simple average of import penetration
across industries, within a year. I also computed the average of import penetration across industries, within
a year, using the share of employment in an industry as weight. The data on employment by SIC 87 industry
is from the NBER productivity database. The weighted import penetration was 6% in 1972 and 16% in
1996. The pattern of growth over time is similar for both measures of import penetration.
15The same document indeed notices that “agricultural exports accounted for almost 47 per cent of total
merchandise exports in 1950, and their share had dropped to 12 per cent by 1996. Manufactures, by
contrast, accounted for 38 per cent of exports in 1950. This share increased to 77 per cent by 1996” and
that “services trade in OECD countries increased at almost twice the rate of merchandise trade between
1980 and 1995”(p.34).
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imported intermediate inputs in total non-energy input purchases, has increased in the
United States from 5.1% in 1972 to 18.1% in 2002. Hummels et al. (2001, Figure 2) shows
how this phenomenon is common to many industrialized countries. Crino` (2009, p.199)
also documents the rapid increase of service oﬀshoring since the 90s in many industrialized
countries.16
Empirical Methodology: Regressions
Many studies use a regression approach to estimate the impact of trade on wages.
A common strategy consists in adding trade-related variables to the Mincerian equation
(II.1):
ln(wsit) = βXst + γTit + λi + µt + ηsit (II.2)
where wsit is the wage of worker s at time t in industry i, β and γ are a vector of coeﬃcients,
Xst is a vector of worker’s variables, Tit is a vector of trade-related measures for time t
in industry i, λi are industry dummies, µt are time dummies and ηsit is the error term.
Sometimes the regression comprises also the interaction between Tit and some element of
Xst such as education. This formulation allows for the case in which the dataset is a
repeated cross-section of workers and the case in which the dataset is a panel of individual
workers.
One challenge of regression (II.2) is that the identification of γ is obtained by the
variation of trade across industries.17 Because of this fact, one would like to have a fairly
large number of industries in the sample. On the other hand, the more disaggregated the
16The focus of this paper is on trade flows. However, in recent decades the movement of capital and labor
across countries has also increased. See Crino` (2009, Figure 1, p.199) for the growth in world FDI outflows
and Borjas et al. (1997, Figure 1, p.5) for the increase in immigration to U.S..
17More precisely, given the presence of industry and time fixed eﬀects, the identification of γ is obtained
by the variation of changes in trade, over time, across industries.
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industries are, the more likely it is that a shock to a certain industry will have general equi-
librium eﬀects on the other industries. Many studies find however only a small reallocation
of workers across industries after a trade shock and so in the literature many have felt that
such concerns can be ignored.18
Another concern in regression (II.2) is measurement error in the regressors of
interest. For the trade variable, Tit, some studies use a “quantity” variable, such as the
value of imports, whereas others use a “price” variable such as a tariﬀ.19 The advantage of
using the latter is that usually models have predictions for the relationship between e.g. the
price of imports and the price of factors. The disadvantages however are that accurate price
data are hard to obtain and that such data may also be misleading. For example, a change
in tariﬀ does not capture any change in the world price that the importing economy faces.
But if a country is large, then a change in its tariﬀ may have an eﬀect on world prices. Even
if the country is small, changes in tariﬀs may be correlated with changes in world prices,
such as an increase in productivity abroad, that may aﬀect the estimate of the coeﬃcients
on the price variables. Moreover, there may be barriers to trade other than tariﬀs so that
a change in tariﬀs need not translate directly into change in domestic prices. So, even if
the choice of the volume of trade as regressor is usually dictated by data availability, the
quantity approach, though not ideal, is not necessarily unjustified.
Whatever trade variable one uses, (II.2) may still be plagued by endogeneity. Time
dummies control for macroeconomic phenomena that aﬀect all sectors and industry dummies
control for time-invariant diﬀerences across sectors. However, trade may be correlated with
some other variable that varies over time at the industry level. This could be productivity,
output or technological change. For this reason many studies include other industry-level
18See the references in section II.4.1.
19Obviously, the value of imports is not a pure quantity variable because it depends on the price of imports
as well.
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variables in regression (II.2) in the hope to reduce this form of endogeneity. In this regard,
however, it is especially concerning that it is hard to have a good proxy for technological
change.
Even if Tit is exogenous or can be instrumented for, there could also still be
endogeneity for the individual-level variables. For example, skill is usually proxied with some
measure of education. But if more able workers self-select into schooling, then the coeﬃcient
on education will not capture the eﬀect of skill on wages. This may be a problem for studies
that want to estimate the impact of Tit on wages across diﬀerent levels of education. Panel
data on workers allows to estimate (II.2) adding individual fixed eﬀects that account for
time-invariant individual ability. The challenges of studies that use panel data on workers
are discussed in Section II.4.1.2 when reviewing the work by Lovely and Richardson (2000)
and Kosteas (2008).
A regression such as (II.2) relies on the assumption that the trade shock is un-
expected. Some studies use as trade shock a specific episode in time.20 If one can argue
that such shock was unanticipated by the economic actors, then one can compare outcomes
before and after the shock to identify the parameters of interest. However, usually the
parameters in (II.2) are identified using the variation in trade across industries over some
period of time. The assumptions required for exogeneity are that the economic actors not
only do not anticipate the first trade shock (assuming the first trade shock hits the economy
in the first year of the sample) but also that they do not adjust their decisions after they
have been hit by such shock (or have observed others being hit by such shocks). These
concerns have motivated the use of structural model that take explicitly into account the
20For example, Verhoogen (2008) use as quasi-experiment the sudden, and arguably unanticipated,
exchange-rate depreciation of 1994 in Mexico.
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forward-looking aspect of economic decisions.21 I examine some of these models in section
II.4.3.
Even if ηsit is truly exogenous, for hypothesis testing it is important to have un-
biased estimates of the standard errors. In (II.2) the assumption of independence of the
errors across observations will probably be violated. First, it is possible that the residuals
of workers who are in the same industry at the same time will be correlated. A strategy
to deal with this is to first regress wages on individual characteristics, take an average of
the residuals within industry-year cells and then regress these average residuals on industry
level variables, industry dummies and time dummies.22 One could be instead be tempted
to cluster the standard errors at the industry-time level. However, it is also possible that
the residuals of workers who are in the same industry at diﬀerent points in time will still
be correlated. Bertrand et al. (2004) show that this serial correlation may severely under-
estimate the standard errors and therefore lead to a high probability of Type I error. Using
simulations, they determine that clustering standard errors at the industry level, rather
than at the industry-year level, will deal satisfactorily with this problem, as long as the
number of clusters is large.23 Therefore many studies that use regression (II.2) cluster the
standard errors at the industry level.
Trade And The Labor Market
21This problem is, at least in theory, distinct from the possibility of feedback eﬀects across industries
mentioned above. Even if there is no feedback across industries, a worker may react to the shock by
changing jobs within its industry or moving out of the labor force. On the other hand, even if a shock to an
industry is unexpected, it may be transmitted to other industries as well.
22In this way one reduces the dataset to a panel of industries. In this case it is possible to also use
first-diﬀerences to estimate the relationship between wage and trade.
23Bertrand et al. (2004) suggest to have around 50 clusters but it is below 20 clusters that serial correlation
impacts standard errors severely.
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Trade and the Skill-Premium
The Stolper-Samuelson Model
The Stolper-Samuelson model has been used to explain the increase in wage in-
equality between skilled and unskilled workers.24 In the simplest version of this model an
economy produces two goods with two factors, skilled and unskilled labor, and exchanges
them with the rest of the world. One good, call it A, is intensive in unskilled labor relative
to the other good, call it B, which is then intensive in skilled labor. An economy that is
abundant in skilled labor, such as the U.S., will export the good that is intensive in skilled
labor and import the good that is intensive in unskilled labor. As trade becomes less costly,
U.S. will export more of good B and import more of good A. So, in U.S. resources will
have to reallocate from the production of good B to the production of good A. Given that
B is intensive in skilled labor, this reallocation will increase the relative demand for skilled
workers. Given that in this model the relative supply of labor is fixed, the increase in the
relative demand will increase wage inequality between skilled and unskilled (assuming, as
usual, that even before the shock skilled workers already were earning more than the un-
skilled workers). The model implies that the opposite process is happening in the country
that U.S. trades with: production is reallocated from good B to good A and the relative
demand for unskilled workers decreases wage inequality between skilled and unskilled work-
ers. Finally, another implication of the model is that, as the relative wage of skilled workers
increase, each sector substitutes away from skilled labor so that the skilled workers’ share
employment is lower in both sectors.
24See e.g. the discussion in Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007, p.58).
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This model has however found scant support in the data. Many studies have indeed
found that the industry employment shares are pretty constant over time: the reallocation
of resources across sectors that is dictated by the Stolper-Samuelson model does not seem to
take place.25 Moreover, wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers has increased
in both developed countries, which are abundant in skilled workers, and in developing
countries, which are abundant in unskilled workers. This contradicts the implication of
the model that inequality should go down in developing countries. Finally, several studies
have documented that the skilled workers’ share of employment has increased in all sectors,
contradicting another implication of the model.26
Technology, Quality Upgrading and Oﬀshoring
Because of the empirical problems of the Stolper-Samuelson model, other models
have been proposed. These models emphasize how trade may aﬀect the skill-premium within
sectors. Some studies focus on the link between trade and skilled-biased technological change
(SBTC hereafter), which is a usual candidate for the explanation of the increase in skill-
premium. These studies show how SBTC can be an endogenous response to competition
from abroad. For example, in Thoenig and Verdier (2003)’s model, domestic firms, when
faced with competition from abroad, engage in more innovation, which is usually a skill-
intensive activity. If for each sector one measures competition from abroad with the volume
of sectoral imports, then an implication of this theory is that higher imports will increase
the relative demand for skilled workers within that sector. Other models focus on the
complementarity between capital and skill: this may aﬀect the skill-premium if trade allows
25See the references in Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007, p.59) and Cosar (2010, fn.4). Section II.4.3 discusses
studies that allow for intersectoral reallocation of labor.
26See Berman et al. (1994) for the U.S. and Attanasio et al. (2004) for Colombia.
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to import capital goods at a cheaper price.27 Alternatively, trade liberalization may be
responsible for quality upgrading within one sector, i.e. the shift of the product mix toward
higher quality varieties. If these higher quality varieties require a more skilled labor force,
this will also increase the relative demand for skill (see Verhoogen (2008)).
Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) emphasize instead the role of trade in intermediate
goods within an industry. Suppose that, in order to produce a final good, several inputs
are needed and that we can order these inputs as to their skill-intensity. A country that is
skill-abundant will tend to produce the skill-intensive inputs and to import the inputs that
are intensive in unskilled labor. As developing countries become more productive they will
export to U.S. more of the inputs that are intensive in unskilled labor in U.S.. For this
reason, an increase in productivity in the developing countries will shift resources away, in
U.S., from the inputs intensive in unskilled labor to skill-intensive ones. Again, this fact
will push up the relative demand of skill within each industry.
Lovely and Richardson (2000) is one of the first works to utilize individual level
workers’ data to study the eﬀect of trade on the skill-premium in the U.S.. They use, for
the 1981-1992 period, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID hereafter), which fol-
lows a panel of U.S. workers over time. They focus on the eﬀect of imports and exports,
disaggregated by source country and use two estimation approaches. In the first one they
regress individual wages on individual workers characteristics (including education), a set
of industry dummies and a set of industry dummies interacted with years of schooling of
the workers. The first set of industry dummies can be considered as the industry wage
premia to labor who does not have any schooling. The second set of industry dummies can
27See the review in Acemoglu (2002, p.27) and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007, Section 5.1.3). Even if these
models are related to the the ones that emphasize the importance of SBTC, they remain distinct. SBTC
theories focus on the advent of new technologies, especially computer, and their impact on the demand for
skilled labor. Capital-skill complementarity theories do not focus only on computers but rather on any kind
of equipment. On this distinction, see also Acemoglu (2002, fn.24).
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be considered as the premium to skill in the various industries. Average wages for skilled
and unskilled workers can vary across industries for many reasons such as compensating
diﬀerentials, sorting of workers across industries based on unobserved ability and rents.28
Lovely and Richardson (2000) emphasize the first interpretation but their first approach
cannot exclude the other possibilities. They then regress these estimated industry premia
(to pure labor and to skill) on various trade measures, other industry level measures and
year dummies. They find that trade with the newly industrialized countries tends to in-
crease the industry premium to skilled workers relative to the industry premium to the
unskilled workers. They interpret this as evidence that trade with newly industrialized
countries increases the relative demand for skilled workers. If one interprets trade with
newly industrialized countries as trade in capital goods or trade in varieties that have lower
quality with respect to U.S. or trade in intermediate inputs, then this result is compatible
with the models outlined above.
An advantage of the PSID is that it allows to control for individual fixed eﬀects:
if workers with diﬀerent unobservable productivities sort into diﬀerent industries, then
the omission of these fixed eﬀects will bias the estimate of the eﬀects of trade on the
skill premium. In their second approach Lovely and Richardson (2000) run a regression
similar to II.2 but also controlling for individual fixed eﬀects. As other regressors they use
individual workers characteristics, a set of industry dummies and their interaction with years
of schooling, trade and other industry level measures and their interaction with schooling.
28In the case of compensating diﬀerentials, identically productive workers may receive diﬀerent wages
because of diﬀerences in relevant characteristics across industries (e.g. safety, amenities etc.). In the case of
unobserved ability, the industry wage premia are due to the heterogeneity of workers’ ability across industries.
This heterogeneity is sometimes considered to be ex-ante and so time-invariant and therefore it is modeled
with the use of individual fixed eﬀects in the wage equation. Finally, as discussed in section II.4.2, rents
may arise both because of a lack of intersectoral workers’ mobility or because of imperfect competition in
the labor market. The lack of intersectoral mobility may be due to the presence of industry-specific human
capital: workers may be identical ex-ante but they are diﬀerent ex-post, due to the industry they end up in.
Imperfect competition, due for example to unionization, is compatible with workers being identical in their
productivity.
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They again find that trade with newly industrialized countries increases the skill-premium
but this result is not robust to the inclusion of year dummies. This is important given
that Lovely and Richardson (2000) do not control for skilled-biased technological change
(SBTC), which is thought to have changed during this period. This result also suggests
that controlling for individual fixed eﬀects may be important when studying the eﬀects of
trade on the skill-premium.
Kosteas (2008) uses instead the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY
hereafter) to estimate the impact of imports from low-wage countries on wages in the 1979-
1996 period. The NLSY is a panel dataset that contains observations on individuals in U.S.
who were aged 14-21 in 1979. He finds that, for the 1979-1988 period, the import share is
correlated with a decrease in the wage of blue collar workers and does not aﬀect the wage
of white collar workers.29 For the 1989-1996 period, he finds no correlation between the
import share and wages of either class of workers. He controls also for outsourcing using
a measure of imports of parts by industry but he does not include the interaction between
outsourcing and the white collar dummy.
The NLSY, as the PSID, is a longitudinal dataset and so it allows to control for
individual fixed eﬀects in the estimation of the impact of trade on wages. When these
eﬀects are included, the eﬀect of imports on the wage of blue-collar workers increases in
absolute value (it is a negative number) and remain significant; moreover, the coeﬃcient
on the interaction between the white-collar dummy and imports becomes smaller and less
significant (Kosteas (2008, Table 3(a), p. 268)).30 Therefore, the inclusion of individual
fixed eﬀects seem to be important.
29Because the source of the trade measure changes in 1989, Kosteas (2008) has to divide the analysis in
two periods.
30To be more specific, he finds that the semi-elasticity of blue collars’ wage with respect to the imports
share from low-wage countries is -.6 and significant at the 1% level. The coeﬃcient on the interaction
between the white-collar dummy and imports is 0.1 and significant only at the 10% level.
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On the other hand, the inclusion of individual fixed eﬀects has its own problems.
Indeed, the coeﬃcient on schooling is estimated only using the within-individual variation
in years of education. For the period 1979-1988, when including individual fixed eﬀects, the
coeﬃcient on years of school remain significant and actually increases (Kosteas (2008, Table
3(a), p. 268)). However, for the period 1989-1996, when including individual fixed eﬀects,
the coeﬃcient on years of school decreases and is no more significant (Kosteas (2008, Table
3(b), p. 270)). This is probably due to the fact that in the 1989-1996 period, the individual
who were between 14 and 21 years old in 1979 are now between 24 and 31 years old, an
age at which most individuals have already obtained an education.31 When individual fixed
eﬀects are included, the small genuine variation in years of schooling may be dominated by
the noise of errors in measuring the years of schooling over time.32
A limit of the studies based on the PSID and NLSY is their limited sample size.
Indeed, these dataset contain data on workers in all sectors but usually the trade measures
are available only for the manufacturing sector. Moreover, the trade measures are at the
industry level so that the identification of their impact is given by variation of workers
across manufacturing sectors. Finally, the NLSY has an additional limit over the PSID.
As already mentioned, the NLSY contains data only on individuals in U.S. who were aged
14-21 in 1979. But the reallocation of labor due to trade may involve also workers who are
older. For example, suppose that higher imports in an industry bring about a reduction
in employment in that industry. If this reduction in employment is mainly achieved via
the early retirement of older workers, then the NLSY will not pick up this reduction in
31Some individuals may be getting post-graduate education. However, the sample includes only workers
who work, at least for two years, in manufacturing. So, the return to post-graduate education would be
estimated using data on individuals who e.g.: a) in 1989 work in manufacturing; b) in 1990 enroll in a Master
program; c) some years later, after completion of the Master program, come back to work in manufacturing.
Given also the small sample size of the NLSY to begin with, it is not surprising that there are only few
individuals who satisfy these conditions so that the return to schooling is hard to identify.
32Borjas (2000) raises a similar point in his comment to Lovely and Richardson (2000).
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employment.
These considerations have motivated the use of a larger sample, the CPS, to study
the impact of trade on the U.S. labor market. Ebenstein et al. (2009) study the impact
of oﬀshoring to low-wage countries on wage inequality for the 1982-2002 period using the
CPS Monthly Outgoing Rotation Group. As a measure of oﬀshoring to low-wage countries
they use the number of workers in a low-wage country that are employed in a subsidiary
of a U.S. multinational. They can compute this measure for the manufacturing industries.
When using industry regressions, they find that oﬀshoring to low-wage countries mildly re-
duces the relative employment of unskilled workers but does not have any eﬀect on wages.33
They attribute this result to the fact that the U.S. labor is relatively mobile across indus-
tries. They also construct a measure of import competition at the occupation level. Using
regressions at the occupation level, they find that oﬀshoring and import competition has
some eﬀect on the increase in the skill-premium and markedly reduces the wages of workers
in some occupations.34
Liu and Trefler (2008) use the March CPS for the 1996-2005 period to study if
the increase in trade in services - that they call “service outsourcing” - has had an eﬀect
on the labor market. They find virtually no eﬀect of trade in services on the probability
of switching occupation, probability of switching industry, the probability of becoming
unemployed and wages of skilled and unskilled workers. They therefore conclude that the
alarm about outsourcing of services is unjustified. As to the wage regression, it is worth
33More precisely, they find that a “10 percentage point increase in oﬀshoring to low-wage countries reduces
employment by .2%” (Ebenstein et al. (2009)).
34More precisely, when constructing the trade measures by occupation, they find an elasticity of -0.05
of wages with respect to the employment of aﬃliates in low-income countries (their measure of oﬀshoring)
and a semi-elasticity of -.27 of wages with respect to import competition (Ebenstein et al. (2009, Table 6
and 7)). The oﬀshoring coeﬃcient is highly significant for the low-skilled workers but not significant for the
more skilled workers: so oﬀshoring seems to increase the skill-premium. Import competition instead does
not seem to have an eﬀect on the skill-premium. The average import competition at the occupation level
was 2% in 1983 and 4% in 2002. However, for some occupations, this measure had a steep increase during
this period: e.g. for shoe machine operators this measure went from 37% in 1983 to 77% in 2002.
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noticing that Liu and Trefler (2008) use the minimal panel structure of the March CPS
and diﬀerence wages across consecutive years for workers who happen to be in the March
CPS in two consecutive years.35 This approach is robust to the fact that wages depend on
individual fixed eﬀect. It however comes at the cost of ignoring the cross-sectional variation
in wages in identifying the parameters of interest and using only the cross-sectional variation
in yearly changes in wages.
To sum up, Lovely and Richardson (2000) find no eﬀect of trade on wages (at least
when including year dummies). Kosteas (2008) finds that, for the 80s, trade decreases blue
collars wages but not white collar ones whereas in the 90s trade does not have a significant
eﬀect on wages of either type of workers. Ebenstein et al. (2009) find no eﬀect of trade at
the industry level on wages but find a negative eﬀect on wages of import competition at the
occupational level. Liu and Trefler (2008) find no eﬀect of oﬀshoring of services on wages.
These results do not present a clear picture and this is not surprising given the endogeneity
concerns raised in section II.3. However, this body of evidence seems incompatible with the
idea that lower skilled workers benefitted from an increase in international openness. What
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) found for developing countries seems to be true for the U.S. as
well. In section II.4.3 however we will review the results of structural models that suggest
that the Mincerian regressions may in practice capture only the short-term eﬀect of trade
and neglect its long-term consequences. These models also suggest that these long-term
consequences may be beneficial to the workers, even up to the point of compensating them
for the temporary wage losses that they may incur in the short-run.
35Their dataset is therefore a cross-section of yearly changes in wages. A worker will not be in the March
CPS for two consecutive years if she e.g. changes her residence during that year. Liu and Trefler (2008)
control for attrition bias with an Heckman’s selection model.
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Trade and Residual Inequality
The residual of the Mincerian equation (II.1) contributes to overall wage inequality
and therefore it is important to understand how it can be related to the increase in global-
ization documented in section II.2.2. Attanasio et al. (2004) emphasize the fact that trade
liberalization may aﬀect the pattern of industry wage premia. They focus on the case of
Colombia in the 1984-1998 period and study the eﬀects of the Colombian tariﬀ reductions
that occurred in 1990-1991. If the reduction of tariﬀs decreases industry wage premia and
if the sectors with the highest tariﬀ reductions are those where the workers were paid the
least before the policy change, then trade liberalization will increase overall wage inequal-
ity. Notice that, at least if industry wage premia do not diﬀer by education level, then this
wage reduction would not be captured by the coeﬃcients in equation (II.1) and therefore
it will be part of the residual.36 Attanasio et al. (2004, p.355) find this to be exactly the
case for Colombia: a 50-point tariﬀ reduction in one industry is estimated to bring about a
2.5% decline in the wage premium of that industry. They report that textiles and apparel
reduced their tariﬀs by around 73 percentage points between 1984 and 1998.
As mentioned above, industry wage premia may arise for many reasons such as
compensating diﬀerentials, sorting of workers across industries based on unobserved ability
and rents. Attanasio et al. (2004) emphasize the latter interpretation but they are not
able to distinguish it from the other two. Industry-specific rents may arise in a perfectly
competitive model such as the short-run ricardian model where workers are, at least in the
short-run, immobile across sectors and so they have to endure a wage decline when facing
import competition. But industry-specific rents may also arise in an imperfect competition
36In order to study the eﬀects of trade on the skill-premium, most of the studies reviewed in section II.4.1.2
rely on wage regressions where the trade measures vary at the industry level. In doing so, they implicitly
assume that the industry wage premia vary across educational categories. They do not however discuss
the impact that industry wage premia may have on overall wage inequality even in the case in which these
premia do not depend on educational categories.
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model: unionized sectors may be able to extract rents above the economy-wide average but
trade liberalization may erode this rents.37
Analogous considerations can be done to motivate the existence of occupation
wage premia. Cragg and Epelbaum (1996) find that a large portion of the increase in
the skill-premium during the 1987-1993 period in Mexico can be attributed to the increase
of the return to specific occupations, such as professionals and administrators. In this
case, including occupation dummies in the wage equation (II.1) aﬀects the estimate of
the coeﬃcient on skill. They also document that the occupations with the highest wages
experienced the largest increase in occupational premia so that occupational premia also
increased residual inequality.
As discussed above, Ebenstein et al. (2009) find that import competition aﬀects
occupational wage premia, especially those of the least skilled. They also document that the
range of such premia diminished in the 1983-2002 period in U.S. making the distribution
of these premia less dispersed (Ebenstein et al. (2009, Figure 10)). However, they do not
discuss if the occupations that were most aﬀected by import competition were those that
paid the lowest wages. If not, import competition may have actually reduced residual
inequality and so overall wage inequality.
Dynamic Eﬀects of Trade
The wage regressions examined so far assume the lack of mobility across industries
or occupations. But it is possible that workers will react to shocks by moving across indus-
tries or occupations. Assuming immobility across sectors seems justified by the empirical
studies, mentioned in section II.4.1, that did not detect a reallocation of resources across
37See the discussion of industry wage premia models in Attanasio et al. (2004, p.351) and in Goldberg
and Pavcnik (2007, Section 5.3).
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industries after episodes of trade liberalization. However, the evidence from these studies,
though suggestive, is not conclusive. Indeed, many of these studies focus, because of data
availability, on the reallocation of resources across manufacturing industries. But trade
liberalization may also move resources out of manufacturing into services or agriculture.
Moreover, the time span of these studies is usually limited: if e.g. capital takes a long time
to reallocate across industries, then these studies may not detect any reallocation even if
one takes place in the end. Finally, these studies focus on the net flows of resources (e.g. the
change over time in the industry employment shares) and not on their gross flows. But the
gross flows are found to be large for some countries, such as U.S. (see Davis and Haltiwanger
(1992)).
Artuc et al. (2010) build a structural model in which each worker can switch
industries, but at a cost. The cost has a component that is common to all workers across
time and one component that is specific to the worker and the period the worker is making
her choice. This second cost component can be negative, reflecting non-pecuniary motives
that workers have in changing industries: for this reason the model then allows for gross
job flows across industries. Artuc et al. (2010) estimate the parameters of the model using
the CPS and then simulate an episode of trade liberalization.
They find that the mean and the standard deviation of the moving costs are very
high. Therefore “US workers change industry a great deal, but those movements do not
respond much to movements in intersectoral wage diﬀerentials” (Artuc et al. (2010, p.1010)).
This then implies that the adjustment of the labor market to a trade shock will be slow. In
their simulation they find that, after the removal of a 30% tariﬀ on manufacturing, the new
steady state is achieved in 8 years. Given that the average moving cost is high, in order to
induce the workers to move out of manufacturing, the wages there have to drop markedly
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right after the removal of the tariﬀ: the simulation of the model implies a 22% drop in
real manufacturing wages.38 Most surprisingly though, they find that even workers who are
in manufacturing at the time of the trade shock may benefit from the trade liberalization.
Indeed, after the removal of the tariﬀ the wages in the other sectors are permanently higher
due to the increase in eﬃciency. But a manufacturing worker, even in the absence of
the trade shock, may move to one of the other sectors because of her idiosyncratic shock.
Because of this option value, a manufacturing worker may experience a wage loss because
of the trade shock but still enjoy a higher lifetime expected utility.39
This result also shows how the results from industry-level regressions such as the
one in section II.4.1 may be misleading. These regressions tend to find a negative eﬀect
of imports on wages: one may then be tempted to infer that imports hurt workers in the
import-competing sector. But this negative eﬀect on the wages of such workers may be
temporary and, as Artuc et al. (2010) show, is actually compatible with an increase in the
long-time utility of workers.
In Artuc et al. (2010)’s model all the heterogeneity among workers is due to the
idiosyncratic shock. However, it is possible that diﬀerent workers stand to gain diﬀerently
from trade liberalization. Artuc (2009) develops a model similar to Artuc et al. (2010) but
allows workers to accumulate sector-specific human capital. This reduces the mobility of
older workers. If a tariﬀ is removed on a certain sector, among the workers in that sector,
the younger workers are less hurt because they can move to other sectors, that have become
now more productive. Old workers are close to retirement and so they are not hurt much
by the decrease in wages. The workers who are hit the most are middle-aged workers: if
38In the new steady state, however, the manufacturing wages are just 2.5% lower than the original steady
state. So, there is overshooting in the sectoral wage adjustment.
39Obviously, there will still be some workers who will be worse-oﬀ ex-post : they are e.g. those who remain
in manufacturing because they are not hit by a large enough idiosyncratic shock that induces them to change
sector.
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they do not change sector, they have to get lower wages for a long time. But if they change
sector, they have to pay a high moving cost because they accumulated sector-specific human
capital. In the export-competing sector the situation is diﬀerent. All workers there benefit
from the liberalization but old workers, again, do not benefit much because they are close
to retirement. Young workers do not benefit much either because the value of their option
of moving to another sector has decreased and this option value is a big part of their utility
given that they have not yet accumulated industry-specific human capital. Those who
benefit the most are the middle-aged workers. They enjoy the increase in wage due to the
eﬃciency gain while the decrease in their option value does not hurt them much. Indeed,
they were not likely to move out of their sector anyway because of the high moving cost
due to their sector-specific human capital.
The models in Artuc et al. (2010) and Artuc (2009) have some limitations. First,
they do not allow for workers to be unemployed and so they may miss an important eﬀect
of trade liberalization. Moreover, in their model trade liberalization dictates, in the long
run, a reallocation of resources across sectors. However, recent theories have emphasized
how trade liberalization often involves a reallocation of resources within sectors. In Melitz
(2003) model, for example, after trade liberalization, the least productive firms in a sector
exit the market while the most productive firms, that are also exporters, increase output
and so employment. In Melitz (2003)’s model this intrasectoral reallocation of resources
increases eﬃciency. To account for this type of reallocation of labor, one needs data not
only on the workers but also on the employers.
Muendler and Menezes-Filho (2007) use matched employer-employee data from
Brazil in 1986-1999 to examine the labor market eﬀects of Brazil’s tariﬀ reduction at the
beginning of the 90s. They find that reduced tariﬀs increase the odds of a worker moving
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out of the formal sector into the informal sector, into self-employment and out of the labor
force.40 The reduced tariﬀs however do not increase the odds that a worker who works
in the formal sector transitions into unemployment. They also find that reduced tariﬀs
decrease the odds of a worker moving out of the informal sector into the informal sector
and into self-employment. Lower tariﬀs however have the positive eﬀect of reducing the
odds of a worker moving out of the informal sector into unemployment and out of the labor
force. Trade theories usually do not distinguish between formal and informal employment.
However, informal employment usually pays lower wages.41 If, as Muendler and Menezes-
Filho (2007)’s results suggest, trade liberalization moves workers out of the formal sector
into the formal sector, then this might be a policy concern.
Muendler and Menezes-Filho (2007) also show that job separations are higher,
and job accessions are lower, in comparative advantage sectors (see tables 9 and 10 in their
paper). This result is not surprising in light of the other studies mentioned above that do
not find a reallocation of resources across sectors after a trade liberalization episode. How-
ever, previous studies have found a reallocation of market shares from the least productive
firms to the most productive firms, within a sector, as predicted in Melitz (2003).42 These
results seem to suggest that, even in absence of intersectoral reallocation of resources, trade
liberalization may still have beneficial eﬀects because of the importance of within-sector
reallocation. However, Muendler and Menezes-Filho (2007) also show that job separations
40The model is a multinomial logit. Suppose that the worker is in the formal sector in industry i at
time t. Muendler and Menezes-Filho (2007) regress the log of the odds ratio of the workers’ alternatives
(formal sector, informal sector, self-employed, unemployment, out of the labor force) at t + 1 on a set of
industry covariates, including tariﬀs, a set of worker covariates and other controls at time t. As to the
industry covariates, they control for both product tariﬀs and intermediate inputs tariﬀs. A reduction in
product tariﬀs increases the odds of the worker moving out of the formal sector into the informal sector,
into self-employment and out of the labor force. A reduction in tariﬀs on inputs has the opposite eﬀect. But
given that product tariﬀs decrease more than input tariﬀs, the first eﬀect dominates. When reporting their
results I will always refer to this net eﬀect of tariﬀ reduction.
41Attanasio et al. (2004, table 3) document the informality wage “discount” in Colombia.
42See Pavcnik (2002) and the discussion in Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007, p.65).
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are higher, and job accessions are lower, at exporting firms (see tables 9 and 10 in their pa-
per). This result suggests that the reallocation of market shares does not imply reallocation
of resources and so its benefits should not be overstated. It is worth noticing how one can
explore these important distinctions only by using a matched employer-employee dataset.
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007, p.78) observe that what is missing from trade studies
that use firm or plant level datasets “is information on the characteristics of the workers
employed by each plant/firm, which is the crucial step needed for establishing a connection
to distributional questions.” The recent availability of matched employer-employee data
seems promising in this regard. In terms of future research, one could for example look at
movement of workers across occupations and not industries, as it is usually done. Indeed,
the results in Ebenstein et al. (2009) and Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b) suggest that
there are occupation-specific rents that may be aﬀected by the increase in globalization.
Conclusion
This paper surveys recent empirical works that study the eﬀects of trade on labor
market outcomes. The focus is on studies that use individual workers’ data. These data
allow to control for the changing variation of the labor force across industries over time. In
this regard, these studies improve over previous ones that do not control for worker level
variables. I first review works that are based on regressions. These works find that, at
least for the U.S., trade either increases wage inequality or has no eﬀect on it. I discuss the
reasons that may explain the variety of these results. These results seems to suggest that, at
least for the U.S., the increase in trade did not benefit the poorest among the workers. This
is in line to what Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) find in their review of studies on developing
countries. I then review empirical works based on structural models. These models suggest
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instead that studies based on wage regressions neglect the long-term consequences of trade
on the reallocation of resources across sectors and the eﬃciency gains associated with it.
I finally show the usefulness of matched employer-employee datasets and discuss along the
way promising avenues for future research.
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Figure 1. Production Workers Employment in U.S. Manuf., 1972-1996
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The Decline of Employment in U.S. Manufacturing
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Figure 2. Import Penetration in U.S. Manufacturing, 1972-1996
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CHAPTER III
OFFSHORING AND THE SKILL-PREMIUM
Introduction
During the 1980s wage inequality in U.S. went up markedly. One of the reasons be-
hind this surge in inequality was the increase in the relative demand for skill.1 Even though
labor economists have not agreed on the relative importance of the possible explanations for
this phenomenon, they tend to rule out that international trade was an important factor. In
their undergraduate textbook, Ehrenberg and Smith (2005) write that the “findings among
economists who have analyzed the eﬀects of trade on inequality are not unanimous, but the
predominant conclusion is that the contributions of international trade to the changes in
wage inequality after 1980 were rather small”.2 Indeed, early studies found the importance
of trade in final goods to be minor.3 However, in a seminal paper, Feenstra and Hanson
(1999) (FH henceforth) find a sizable eﬀect of trade in intermediate manufactured inputs on
the relative demand for skill in U.S. during the 1980s. Given that this recent result stands
in contrast to the previous literature on the subject, the “case” concerning the importance
of trade on wage inequality has been reopened. This work aims at bringing new empirical
evidence to this debate.
1Autor et al. (2008) and Acemoglu (2002) document the increase in the U.S. skill-premium, defined as
the wage diﬀerence between workers with college education and workers without a college education. They
also argue that this increase is mainly due to an increase in the relative demand for skill rather than to a
decrease in the relative supply of skill.
2In his review of the literature on the subject, Acemoglu (2002, p.52) argues that “increased international
trade by itself is not the cause of the changes in the U.S. wage structure” even though he then adds that
trade may have had a more indirect role on wage inequality by aﬀecting the skill bias of technological change.
3See the studies discussed in Acemoglu (2002, p.53-54) An exception, not discussed in Acemoglu (2002),
is Revenga (1992) who finds a significant impact of import prices of final goods on employment and wages.
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This paper studies the eﬀect of oﬀshoring on the skill-premium, using individual
workers’ data from the March Current Population Survey (March CPS henceforth).4 The
advantage of this strategy is twofold. First, the March CPS has been widely used by labor
economists to document the evolution of the skill-premium over time. Except for Ebenstein
et al. (2009), whose contribution I discuss below, the Current Population Survey has not
been however used to address the importance of the eﬀect of oﬀshoring of manufacturing
on the skill-premium.5 This may also have contributed to the fact that, even after the
contribution of FH, many labor economists seem to be still skeptical about the role of trade
on wage inequality in U.S..6 It is natural to address this gap in the literature by making
use of the March CPS dataset.
Secondly, and more substantially, individual workers’ data allows me to assess a
limitation of FH’s contribution. Their work relies on workers’ data that are aggregated at the
industry level, which does not allow one to control for demographic compositional changes
of the labor force within industries that may be spuriously correlated with oﬀshoring. To
illustrate the potential importance of this, consider the following argument. We know as
a stylized fact that wages are increasing in job experience.7 Suppose that, for reasons
unrelated to oﬀshoring, young graduates do not enter a certain industry where oﬀshoring
happens to go up: we observe oﬀshoring going up and the skill-premium going up but this
is just a spurious correlation. In the above scenario the estimates in FH of the eﬀect of
trade on wage inequality would be biased upward.
4I use the term oﬀshoring to indicate trade in intermediate inputs.
5The first paper that uses the March CPS to address the importance of globalization on the skill-premium
in the U.S. is, to my knowledge, Goldberg and Tracy (2003). They study the eﬀect of exchange rate
fluctuations, and not of oﬀshoring trade per se, on the U.S. skill-premium. Liu and Trefler (2008) study
the eﬀect of oﬀshoring of services, not of manufacturing, on various labor market outcomes. Liu and Trefler
(2008) also focus on a more recent period than I do.
6Autor et al. (2006) however suggest that oﬀshoring may be important to explain the pattern of wage
inequality during the 90s and beyond.
7See Murphy and Welch (1990).
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To overcome this problem, I merge the March CPS dataset, a large representative
sample of the U.S. population, with industry-level variables such as oﬀshoring trade and a
proxy for skill-biased technological change (SBTC, henceforth), which is usually indicated
as one of the main factors driving the increase in the skill-premium. As FH, I focus on the
1979-1990 period and on oﬀshoring trade in manufacturing, abstracting from the services
sector.8 In order to motivate my regression approach, I use the simple model in Feenstra
(2004, Ch. 4) to show how oﬀshoring may aﬀect the relative wage of skilled labor.
A related paper is Ebenstein et al. (2009) who also use individual workers’ data
from the CPS to study the eﬀect of oﬀshoring on the U.S. labor market. As a measure of the
oﬀshoring of a sector, they use data on foreign aﬃliate employment for U.S. multinational
firms within that sector. They are also able to distinguish foreign aﬃliates by low and
high-income countries. I use instead FH’s measure of oﬀshoring which proxies, for each
sector, the share of imported inputs.9
Both measures have advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, the measure
of Ebenstein et al. (2009) is able to distinguish between the countries from which U.S. is
sourcing inputs. This is important because, as the model in Section III.2 suggests, it is
oﬀshoring to low-income countries, and not just oﬀshoring per se, that is expected to af-
fect wage inequality.10 On the other hand, my measure captures both channels through
8Autor et al. (2008, p.3) document that the pattern of wage inequality in U.S. has changed in the 90s
with respect to the 80s. In the 80s the increase in inequality was monotonic: higher incomes rose and lower
incomes fell. In the 90s, the gap between the 90th wage percentile and the 50th wage percentile continued to
grow but the gap between the 50th wage percentile and the 10th wage percentile stabilized. This evidence
suggests that at the end of the 80s there may have been a structural break in the evolution of the U.S. wage
inequality. Autor et al. (2008) also document a similar pattern for the skill-premium, not just for overall
wage inequality. For this reason, I choose to use a trade model that has the potential of explaining the
increase in the skill-premium during the 80s. I leave to future research to explore more complex mechanisms
through which international trade may be able to account for the evolution of the U.S. skill-premium in the
80s and in the 90s.
9See Section III.3 for a discussion of this measure.
10Importantly, however, FH do not distinguish between the two kinds of oﬀshoring but still find an impact
of oﬀshoring on wage inequality.
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which oﬀshoring can take place, i.e. intrafirm and arm’s length trade in intermediate in-
puts. Indeed, a domestic firm can import inputs from a foreign aﬃliate or it can outsource
production of some of its inputs to a foreign, unaﬃliated, firm. From the point of view of
an oﬀshoring model such as the one in Section III.2, these two channels have the same eﬀect
on the skill-premium and so empirically they should be both taken into account.11
I study separately the correlation of oﬀshoring with wages and the correlation of
oﬀshoring with employment. I document the importance of controlling for demographic
characteristics of the labor force in the wage regressions. When these controls are omitted,
oﬀshoring explains at least 50% of the increase in the skill-premium. This result is similar
to the one in FH. They do not control for demographic characteristics of the labor force
and find that, depending on the specification, oﬀshoring explains between 15% and 40% of
the increase in the skill-premium. When I include demographic controls, I find that the
eﬀect of oﬀshoring on the skill-premium markedly decreases in all specifications. I argue
therefore that, in order to determine the eﬀect of oﬀshoring on the skill-premium, one needs
to account for the interaction between oﬀshoring and the demographic composition of the
labor force.
I also find that oﬀshoring is correlated with a decrease in the employment of
less skilled workers and it is uncorrelated with the employment of more skilled workers.
According to the estimates, an industry exposed to the average change in oﬀshoring during
this period experiences at least an 8% increase in the relative employment of skilled workers.
This result suggests that, at least for U.S. in the 80s, oﬀshoring has played an important
role in the increase in the skill-premium by increasing the economy-wide relative demand
for skilled workers.
11See the discussion in Feenstra and Hanson (1996b) and in Antras and Helpman (2004, p.553-554).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section III.2 presents the model of
how oﬀshoring aﬀects the skill-premium. Section III.3 describes the dataset and document
some of the main features of the data. Section III.4 contains the results and Section III.5
concludes. The Appendix explains more in detail the dataset.
Theory
The literature on wage inequality has documented that in the 80s both the relative
supply and the relative wage of skilled workers have increased.12 Therefore the relative
demand for skilled workers should also have increased, or accelerated if it was already
increasing. In this section I present a variant of the simple model in Feenstra (2004, Ch. 4)
that allows me to derive a relationship between oﬀshoring and relative demand for skilled
workers. The model assumes that workers cannot move across sectors but can move within
sectors. The model can be seen as an application of the Heckscher-Ohlin model to an
industry rather than, as usual, to a country.
The basic idea of the model is that in each industry there are two tasks that need
to be performed to produce a unit of the final good and that these tasks diﬀer in skill-
intensity. An example can be the car industry that needs tires and managerial services to
produce a unit of final output. The production of tires is intensive in unskilled labor relative
to the production of managerial services. If there is a decrease in the costs of oﬀshoring
from U.S. to countries, such as Mexico, that are relatively abundant in unskilled labor,
then U.S. will outsource to Mexico the task that, in U.S, is intensive in unskilled labor,
such as the production of tires, and Mexico will outsource to U.S. the task that is intensive
in skilled-labor, such as managerial services. This will bid up the relative demand for skilled
12See, e.g., the figure at page 15 of Acemoglu (2002).
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labor in U.S..
More formally, assume that in U.S. an industry j uses two intermediate inputs,
y1j and y2j .13 Production functions for intermediate inputs are of the Cobb-Douglas form:
y1j = L
α
1jH
1−α
1j
y2j = L
β
2jH
1−β
2j
where, for input i = 1, 2, Lij andHij are, respectively, unskilled and skilled labor in industry
j.14 Notice that the exponents in the Cobb-Douglas function do not depend on the industry
j. We assume that α > β, i.e. that input 1 is intensive in unskilled labor and input 2 is
intensive in skilled labor.15
The production of each intermediate input is competitive and the prices of in-
termediate inputs are exogenously set on the world market. Workers cannot move across
sectors but can move within sectors. Assuming incomplete specialization, i.e. that in equi-
librium U.S. will produce a positive quantity of both inputs, the zero profit conditions in
each industry are:
G(α)wαj q
1−α
j = pj
G(β)wβj q
1−β
j = 1 (III.1)
where pj is the price of input 1, wj is the wage of the unskilled workers, qj is the wage of
the skilled workers, G (x) = 1
xx(1−x)1−x for x = α,β and both the wages and the price of
13I also use the term sector as synonymous for the term industry.
14The main implication of the model is robust to the introduction of a total factor productivity term that
is common to the production of both inputs. For this reason this term is omitted here.
15Let L be the employment of the unskilled workers and H the employment of the skilled workers. By
definition, input 1 is intensive in unskilled labor relative to input 2 if, for any ordered pair (L,H), at (L,H)
the marginal rate of substitution of input 1 is higher than the marginal rate of substitution of input 2.
Graphically, at (L,H) the isoquant for input 1 intersects from above the isoquant for input 2. An equivalent
definition can be formulated in terms of the isocost curves of the two inputs rather than in terms of their
isoquants.
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input 1 are expressed in terms of input 2.16
It is worth spelling out how the various assumptions operate in the formulation
of the above equilibrium conditions. First, wages, both for unskilled and skilled labor,
vary across industries because of the absence of sectoral mobility and the possible diﬀerent
values of pj across industries. This is due to the fact that the exogenous market price pj
pinpoints the (wj , qj) pair in each industry and that these diﬀerences in factor prices cannot
be arbitraged away.
Second, I do not index the inputs’ cost function to the industry: so, for example,
a unit of skilled-intensive input is produced with the same technology in all industries. In
other words, α and β have no industry index. Empirically this allows the estimation of the
eﬀect of oﬀshoring on wage by using the variation of oﬀshoring across industries.
We assume that, for each sector, the home country, U.S. in our case, imports
input 1 and exports input 2. This will be the case if, for each sector, relative to the rest of
the world, U.S. is abundant in skilled labor.17 We refer to pj as the cost of oﬀshoring in
industry j. As pj goes down, the input that is intensive in unskilled labor becomes cheaper.
Therefore U.S. reduces its production of input 1 and increases its imports of input 1. At
the same time, the workers released from the production of input 1 move, within the same
sector, to the now more profitable production of input 2 increasing thereby the U.S. exports
of input 2.18 In other words, when pj goes down, in U.S. the production of the skill-intensive
input goes up and the production of the input that is intensive in unskilled labor goes down.
16Assuming incomplete specialization is equal to assuming that the ratio of factor endowments lies in a
certain region of the non-negative orthant. This region is usually referred to as the “diversification” cone.
If the ratio of factor endowments lies in it, then, at the factor prices obtained from solving the system of
equations (III.1), there exists a non-negative pair (y1j , y2j) that solves the full-employment conditions at
home. See Feenstra (2004, chapter 1 and 2). With the Cobb-Douglas assumption there will always exist a
unique solution to the zero-profit conditions.
17This is just an application of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. See e.g. Feenstra (2004, Chapter 1 and 2).
18See Feenstra (2004, chapter 1 and 2) for a formal proof of this fact.
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In our example, when facing a lower price of tires, the U.S. car industry will decrease the
in-country production of tires and increase the purchase of tires from abroad.
This intra-sectoral reallocation of resources from the production of the unskilled
labor intensive input to the production of the skill-intensive input increases the relative
demand for skilled workers. This can be verified by solving the zero-profit conditions for
wj and qj and obtaining:
ln(wj) = [
1− β
α− β ]ln(pj) +D (III.2)
ln(qj) = [− β
α− β ]ln(pj) +N (III.3)
where D and N are two constants. Therefore we have, in each industry j:
dln( qjwj )
dln(pj)
= −[ 1
α− β ]ln(pj) (III.4)
Given that by assumption α > β, the skill-premium qjwj increases when pj decreases. This
is the main hypothesis that I will test.
A decrease in pj can occur for a variety of reasons. For industry j, define pjw as
the world price of input 1 in terms of input 2 and assume, as we have done, that the home
country is already importing input 1. Assume that, for a unit of input 1 to arrive in U.S.
from abroad, 1 + t units of input 1 must be shipped from abroad, with t > 0. t captures in
a simplified manner the per unit transportation costs in shipping input 1 from abroad to
the home country, ad valorem tariﬀs imposed by the home country on imports of input 1
and per unit non-tariﬀ barriers to imports. Because of our perfect competition assumption,
the domestic relative price of input 1 in terms of input 2, i.e. pj , is then equal to (1+ t)pjw.
A decrease in t will decrease pj , leaving unaﬀected the exogenous world price pjw.
43
If instead producers of input 1 abroad become more productive, then, because
of perfect competition, pjw will decrease and, for any given t, pj will also decrease. This
second scenario may occur because of productivity growth in less developed countries such
as Mexico. Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) introduce capital into a model that is more
complex than the one presented here but similar in spirit. They find that foreign direct
investment from the home country to the foreign country also brings down pj .19 In my
dataset, my measure of oﬀshoring increases over time. I assume only that a model such as
the one presented here captures the main mechanism according to which oﬀshoring increased
during this period. I remain agnostic about the source of this increase in oﬀshoring because,
as long as it works through a decrease in pj , it will have the testable implication that the
skill-premium should increase.
A large literature in labor economics finds that the skill-premium also depends
on skill-biased technological change.20 SBTC can be accommodated in the model above as
follows. Let the production functions for the two inputs be:
y1j = (aLL1j)
α(aHH1j)
1−α (III.5)
y2j = (aLL2j)
β(aHH2j)
1−β (III.6)
where aL and aH are skilled, respectively unskilled, labor augmenting terms. Then it can
be shown that the log of the skill premium depends linearly and positively on the log of
19See proposition 6.3 in Feenstra and Hanson (1996a, p.104).
20See Katz and Autor (1999) and Acemoglu (2002).
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aH/aL, that is usually interpreted as a measure of the skill-bias of the technology.
Discussion
This model does not take into account the relationship between diﬀerent industries
in the same country. In practice, this model treats each industry as a single country and
focus on the trade of that industry with the corresponding industry abroad, e.g. the trade
between the auto industry in U.S. with the auto industry in Mexico. This is done for three
related reasons. First, the textbook Heckscher-Ohlin model is usually applied to a single
country and predicts that opening the economy to trade will increase the skill-premium if
the relative price of the skilled-intensive final goods increases. This change in prices brings
then about a reallocation of resources across sectors. However, early studies did not detect
such change in prices.21 For this reason, the model used here abstracts from linkages among
sectors in the same economy.
Second, SBTC is usually considered a key determinant of the increase in the skill-
premium. SBTC is usually assumed to increase the relative demand of skilled workers in
all sectors and, for this reason, SBTC is considered to reallocate resources mainly within
each sector rather than across sectors.22 The model above shows how, when focusing on
trade in intermediate goods, trade can also reallocate resources within each sector.
Finally, and most importantly from an empirical point of view, treating sectors
as independent from one another allows me to test the implications of the model above by
using industry-level variation in oﬀshoring.
Suppose instead that both skilled and unskilled workers are allowed to move across
21See the discussion in Acemoglu (2002, p. 53).
22Berman et al. (1994), an important study in this area, argue, without providing a formal model, that
SBTC is likely to reallocate resources within sectors rather than across sectors. Xu (2001) and Haskel and
Slaughter (2002), however, show formally how this is not necessarily the case and that the eﬀect of SBTC
on the relative demand of skilled labor may depend on the sector in which SBTC occurs.
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sectors. Therefore a wage diﬀerential across sectors for, say, skilled workers will induce a
movement of skilled workers from the sector with a low wage to the sector with a higher
wage. In this case, the sectors within the economy will not be independent. If so, even if
oﬀshoring increases the relative demand for skilled labor at the economy level, a regression
that relies on industry-level variation in oﬀshoring will find no eﬀect at all of oﬀshoring on
the wage diﬀerential between skilled and unskilled workers. In order to somehow address
this concern I also test the, not modeled, hypothesis that, when oﬀshoring goes up in an
industry, the relative employment of skilled workers will go up.23
Data Description
My sample is obtained by merging a dataset that contains information at the
individual level and other datasets with information about the industry of the worker. I
obtain individual level data from the March CPS, for the 1979-1990 period. I restrict the
sample to the manufacturing workers because only for those workers I am able to construct
a measure of oﬀshoring. These workers amount to about 20% of the U.S. workforce in the
80s.
I compute oﬀshoring as in FH. Besides the fact that I have access to individual
workers’ data while they do not, there are however three main diﬀerences between FH’s
dataset and mine. First, I use only 19 two-digits industries while they use 450 four-digits
industries.24 Indeed, my model assumes no inter-sectoral mobility of workers: I use very
aggregated industries in order to match this assumption. Moreover, the March CPS reports
the industry of a worker only at the three and two digit level. The precision of the three-
23See Revenga (1992) and Ebenstein et al. (2009) for a similar approach.
24I drop the Tobacco industry because in my sample there are only very few workers in this industry each
year and so the sample cannot be considered representative of the workforce in this industry.
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digits industry has been questioned in previous studies and so I opt to work with two-digits
industries.25 Secondly, FH work with diﬀerences between the peaks of the business cycle
whereas I work with annual data. Third, as explained below, I use a proxy for SBTC that
is diﬀerent from the one they use.
Following FH, I define oﬀshoring Ojt as:
Ojt =
￿
i
(pitqijt)
Mit
Yit+Mit−Xit￿
i
pitqijt
(III.7)
where, at time t, pit is the price of the final good from sector i, qijt is the input quantity
that the manufacturing industry j buys from the manufacturing industry i, Yit, Mit and Xit
are respectively domestic shipments, imports and exports of industry i and the indexes i
and j vary only over manufacturing industries. Notice that in the input-output table we do
not observe pit and qijt independently but only their product pitqijt. Given that
￿
i
pitqijt
is the total (manufacturing) cost of production for the final good j, then we can rewrite
(III.7) as:
Ojt =
￿
i
(sijt)
Mit
Yit +Mit −Xit (III.8)
where sijt is the share of (manufacturing) expenditures of sector j on input i at time t
and the second term of the product is a measure of import penetration. The measure of
oﬀshoring is then an average, with the expenditures shares as weights, of numbers that vary
between 0 and 1. Therefore the measure of oﬀshoring varies between 0 and 1 and can be
thought as the share of imported intermediate inputs for a given industry. I obtain data on
the sijt terms from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) input-output tables and the
variables to compute import penetration from the NBER manufacturing trade dataset (see
25See Kambourov and Manovskii (2004) on the measurement error in the assignment of a worker to an
industry in the March CPS.
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the Appendix for details).
Following Ebenstein et al. (2009), as a measure of SBTC I use the deflator of
industry investment divided by the personal consumption expenditure index. This is then
the real price of investment in a certain industry in terms of current consumption.26 I use
this proxy for SBTC under the assumption that, as the real price of investment decreases,
SBTC will increase.
The sample is composed by a a cross-section of 141,914 individual manufacturing
workers for the 1979-1990 period. As it can be seen from Table 3, the sample is composed
mainly by white male workers, 14% of whom have at least a college degree. This sample
includes workers, 18-65 years old, who were not self-employed and who earned only wage
income during the year.27 The sample includes both part-time and full-time workers.
Table 3. Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Log Real Hourly Wage -1.92 0.56 -4.23 3.28
Weeks worked last year 46.53 11.45 1 52
Hours worked per week last year 41.41 6.42 1 99
Ed.n: less than high-school 0.24 0.43 0 1
Ed.n: high-school degree 0.46 0.5 0 1
Ed.n: some college 0.16 0.37 0 1
Ed.n: college or more 0.14 0.35 0 1
Job Experience 19.85 12.67 0 59
White 0.89 0.32 0 1
Female 0.35 0.48 0 1
Lag Oﬀshoring 0.1 0.04 0.03 0.22
Lag Real Price of Investment -4.1 0.06 -4.2 -3.96
Lag TFP -0.03 0.04 -0.17 0.06
N 141914
26In a previous version of the paper I also experimented with the measures of SBTC used by FH. Their
measure of SBTC is the share of high-technology assets in total capital in a certain industry and year.
However, I was not able to replicate the main statistics for their measure. In particular, according to my
computations, the mean of the measure I compute is around half of the mean of their measure. More
importantly, my computed measure increases over time only slightly and so it does not seem to capture the
increase in SBTC that other studies have found to occur in the 1980s. For this reason I abandoned the use
of this measure and concentrate on the real price of investment as a proxy for SBTC.
2799% of workers were in the private sector and the rest in government jobs.
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As it has been widely documented in the labor economics literature, the skill-
premium increased during this period for the population of workers at large.28 I show
that this is the case also when we restrict the sample only to manufacturing workers. In
order to do this, for each year of the sample, I regress the log hourly wage on a white race
dummy, sex dummy, job experience and job experience squared and education dummies for
workers with, respectively, less than a high-school degree, a high-school degree and some
years of college but no degree. The omitted category for education is having a college
degree. The regression uses as weights the weights provided by the March CPS multiplied
by the number of hours each worker worked in the past year. Given that the wage is in
log form, the coeﬃcient on an education dummy estimates the percentage diﬀerence in a
given year between a worker in that education category and a worker with a college degree.
I multiply these coeﬃcients by minus one and graph them over time in Figure 3.29 As it
can be seen, the premium of holding a college degree with respect to each other education
category increased during the 1980s. In particular, the wage premium of workers with
a college degree with respect to workers with only a high school degree increased by 13
percentage points, from 42% to 55%.30
As Figure 4 shows, oﬀshoring and SBTC also grew in this period.3132 Average
28See Katz and Autor (1999).
29For each year of the sample, I regress the log hourly wage on a white race dummy, sex dummy, potential
job experience and potential job experience squared and education dummies for workers with less than a
high-school degree, with a high-school degree and with some years of college but no degree. The omitted
category for education is having a college degree. The regression uses as weights the weights provided by the
March CPS multiplied by the total number of hours each worker worked in the past year. Given that the
wage is in log form, (minus one times) the coeﬃcient on an education dummy estimates, in each year, the
percentage diﬀerence in hourly wage between a worker with a college degree and a worker in that education
category. Source: March CPS 1980-1991.
30This result is similar to what Katz and Autor (1999) find for the whole sample of workers, not just
manufacturing workers, during the same period.
31As mentioned above, I assume that as the relative price of investment goes down, SBTC goes up.
32Figure 4. Lag of oﬀshoring and lag of SBTC, U.S. manufacturing, 1979-1990. Oﬀshoring is measured on
the left axis while SBTC is measured on the right axis. Oﬀshoring is measured as the share of imported inputs
as described in the Appendix. SBTC is measured by the log of the deflator of industry investment divided by
the personal consumption expenditure index. Oﬀshoring and SBTC are aggregated, by weighted averages,
at the CPS two-digits level, as also described in the Appendix. Source: NBER trade and manufacturing
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oﬀshoring was 8.4% in 1979 and 12.4% in 1990 and so it increased on average 4 percentage
points. The average log of the real price of investment was -4.04 in 1979 and -4.18 in 1990
and so it decreased on average 14 percentage points. The correlation between oﬀshoring and
the real price of investment is -0.16 and highly significant. I will not be able to control for
the fact that oﬀshoring may induce SBTC. This possibility has been theoretically advanced
by Acemoglu (2003) and finds empirical support in Bustos (2010). If oﬀshoring induces
SBTC, then the estimates of the eﬀect on oﬀshoring will be biased downward and therefore
my estimates should be considered a lower bound on the true eﬀect of oﬀshoring.33
As it can be expected, there is cross-sectional variation in the demographic com-
position of industries. Most importantly for our purposes, the demographic composition of
some industries changes over time. Figure 5, 6 and 7 show for each industry the evolution
over time, respectively, of the employment share of white workers, of the average potential
job experience and of the employment share of female workers. Some industries show con-
siderable variation over time. For example in the textile industry the employment share of
white workers is estimated to be 89% in 1979 and 77% in 1990.34 Since 1979 to 1990 in
the petroleum industry the average potential job experience is estimated to have decreased
by about 3 years whereas in the rubber industry is estimated to have increased by about 3
years. The female share seems relatively constant over time in all industries.
For each industry I compute the year-to-year changes in oﬀshoring, SBTC, the
employment share of white workers and the average experience. Keeping one observation
per industry per year I then compute the correlation among these variables. There is no
data.
33Obviously, if instead SBTC induces oﬀshoring, then my estimates of the eﬀect on oﬀshoring will be
biased upward. I am however not aware of any theory, formal or informal, according to which SBTC may
cause oﬀshoring.
34These are estimates because we do not have data on all workers in a certain industry, only a random
sample of the population, some members of which work in manufacturing industries. We use the sampled
workers to estimate the demographic shares for each industry.
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correlation between the change in SBTC and the change in the demographic variables.
The correlation between the change in oﬀshoring and the change in the employment share
of white workers is −0.12 and significant at the 10% level. The correlation between the
change in oﬀshoring and the change in the average job experience is 0.15 and significant
at the 5% level. During this period the share of employment in the manufacturing sector
decreased: suppose that, because of this, fewer young workers entered into manufacturing.
Then this fact, together with the increase in oﬀshoring during this period, might rationalize
the positive correlation between the change in oﬀshoring and the change in the average job
experience.
I then compute the fraction of skilled workers, i.e. workers with a college degree,
who are white and the fraction of skilled workers who are female. I do the same for unskilled
workers. I also compute the average experience for skilled workers and for unskilled workers.
I then compute the yearly changes of all these variables and compute the correlation with
the yearly change in oﬀshoring. The change in oﬀshoring has a correlation of 0.15 with
the average job experience of skilled workers. This correlation is significant at the 5%
level. The correlation between the change in oﬀshoring and average job experience of
unskilled workers is 0.12 and significant at the 10% level. So, for both skilled and unskilled
workers the average experience increases, which is compatible with the idea that both fewer
young skilled and fewer young unskilled workers entered into manufacturing in this period.
However, the magnitude of the correlation is larger, and more significant, for skilled workers:
this suggests that not controlling for the experience of workers may bias upward the estimate
of the impact of oﬀshoring on the skill-premium because experienced workers tend to earn
more.
The correlation between the change in oﬀshoring and the change in the fraction of
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unskilled workers who are white is negative and significant at the 10% level. The change in
the fraction of skilled workers who are white is uncorrelated with the change in oﬀshoring.
As white workers tend to earn more, this suggests that not controlling for workers’ race may
again bias upward the estimate of the impact of oﬀshoring on the skill-premium.35 These
simple correlations motivate the use of demographic data to study the eﬀect of oﬀshoring
on wages.
Results
Wages: Individual-Level Regressions
My basic regression model for wages has this form:
Smjt = λ1 + φXm + γOj,t−1 + ψ1Techj,t−1 + ψ2Indj,t−1 + ζj + µt + ￿mjt (III.9)
where Smjt is the wage, in log units, of an individual worker m in industry j at time t,
λ1 is a constant, Xm is a vector of demographic characteristics, Oj,t−1 and Techj,t−1 are,
respectively, a measure of oﬀshoring and of SBTC of industry j at time t − 1, Indj,t−1
are other time-varying industry-level variables, ζj is an industry fixed eﬀect, µt is a time
fixed eﬀect and ￿mjt is an error assumed to be randomly distributed. I will estimate this
regression on four mutually exclusive education categories: the workers who have less than
a high-school degree, those with a high-school degree but no further schooling, college drop-
outs and workers with at least a college degree.36 The main hypothesis is that, the higher
the skill (i.e. the educational achievement), the higher the coeﬃcient on oﬀshoring. In other
35Both for skilled and unskilled workers, there is no significant correlation between the change in oﬀshoring
and the change in the fraction of workers who are female.
36These variables are defined in the Appendix. See Ebenstein et al. (2009) for a similar approach.
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words, oﬀshoring increases the wage of skilled workers relatively to the wage of unskilled
workers.
I estimate (III.9) by pooling, for each education category, all workers in all indus-
tries in all years in the sample and using industry and year dummies for, respectively, ζj and
µt. As dependent variable I use the log of hourly wage, deflated by the personal consump-
tion expenditure (PCE) index.37 As demographics I use a female dummy, job experience,
the square of job experience and a white race dummy. As a measure of oﬀshoring and of
SBTC I use, respectively, the oﬀshoring share and the log of the real price of investment
as described in Section III.3. I add total-factor productivity (TFP) as Indj,t−1 in (III.9) to
control for the fact that, if there are frictions in moving from one industry to the other, it
is possible that an increase in TFP in one industry will bring about an increase in wages in
that industry. The industry level variables are lagged one year in order to allow some time
for the labor market adjustment to take place.
The industry dummies control for the fact that average wages diﬀer across indus-
tries. Moreover, I do not want the identification of the oﬀshoring coeﬃcient to rely on the
cross-sectional variation across industries. Indeed, I am interested in knowing whether the
increase over time in oﬀshoring during the 80s is responsible for the concurrent increase in
the skill-premium. For this reason the model in Section III.2 assumes that all industries have
the same features. Empirically, however, diﬀerent industries may have diﬀerent oﬀshoring
levels and, potentially correlated, diﬀerent average wages because of structural diﬀerences
across industries that I have not modeled. Therefore, I need to control for time-invariant
variation across industries.
The year dummies control for the fact that wages and oﬀshoring may co-move
37See the Appendix to see how this hourly wage is computed.
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with time. Indeed, if wages track long-run GDP growth, they will tend to increase over
time. Also, if, as in gravity equation models, trade increases with GDP, oﬀshoring will
also increase with GDP growth.38 If we do not control for time variation that is common
across industries, the coeﬃcient on oﬀshoring may be biased by the correlation of wages
and oﬀshoring with time.
The regression uses as weights the weights provided by the March CPS multiplied
by the number of hours each worker worked on average in the past year. This reflects the
idea that, other things equal, the higher the number of hours a worker collects a certain
hourly wage, the higher the information that that observation provides on the distribution
of the wage variable.
The error terms in (III.9) are probably correlated. First, even with the industry
dummies, workers who are in the same industry in the same year are probably exposed to a
common wage shock and so their residuals will be correlated. Second, these industry-level
shocks are probably correlated over time and so the residuals of two workers who are in
the same industry but in diﬀerent years may still be correlated. In order to cope with this
issue, I follow Angrist and Pischke (2009, p.319) who suggest to cluster the standard errors
at the industry level in these cases.
The results are displayed in Table 4. All the demographic variables behave as
expected and have significant coeﬃcients. The hourly wage appears to be increasing and
concave in job experience. Whites earn more per hour than non-whites. The coeﬃcient on
the male dummy is positive.
The coeﬃcients on oﬀshoring do not increase monotonically with skill. However,
oﬀshoring is significantly correlated with lower wages for the workers with some years of
38According to the gravity equation of trade, trade between two countries is an increasing function of GDP
of each country. For a recent theoretical derivation of the gravity equation, see, e.g., Eaton and Kortum
(2002).
54
college and it is not significantly correlated with the wage of workers with a college degree. In
this sense, this table oﬀers some mild evidence that an increase in oﬀshoring was correlated
with an increase in the skill-premium. A discussion of the magnitudes of these eﬀects is
deferred to below.
Contrary to the hypothesis, the coeﬃcients on the proxy for SBTC also do not
decrease monotonically with skill.39 Looking only at the magnitudes of these coeﬃcients, it
is true that both workers with some college and workers with a college degree have a more
negative coeﬃcient on, and therefore are benefited relatively more by, SBTC than lower
skilled workers. However, the gap between workers with some college and workers with a
college degree appears to be actually reduced by SBTC.
The results of this set of regressions should however be taken with some caution
because of the presence of high collinearity among oﬀshoring, SBTC, the industry and the
year dummies. Indeed, there are 18 industry dummies that take away 18 degrees of freedom.
As long as collinearity is not perfect, the OLS estimates will still be consistent, conditional
on the exogeneity of the regressors. But with high collinearity the coeﬃcient estimates will
not be precise and may even have the wrong sign. The oﬀshoring measure especially suﬀers
from this problem.
For this reason I also study a more parsimonious specification. In order to alleviate
the collinearity problem I drop the year and industry fixed eﬀects and add instead other
variables to control for the potential sources of endogeneity discussed above. To control
for the fact that there are wage diﬀerentials across industries I add as regressor, for each
skill category, the average log wage for that category at the beginning of the sample, i.e. in
1979. To control for the fact that there may be structural diﬀerences according to which,
39A negative coeﬃcient means that SBTC has a positive eﬀect on wage because, as the real price of
investment goes up, SBTC goes up.
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cross-sectionally, industries diﬀer in oﬀshoring and SBTC, I add as regressors the value of
oﬀshoring and of SBTC in 1979. Finally, we observed above that the wage variation over
time may be spuriously correlated with the increase over time of oﬀshoring and of SBTC:
in order to control for this, I add the lag of the log of economy-wide real GDP.
The results for this specification are shown in Table 5. The demographic variables
are included in all the four regressions but are not reported in the table because their
coeﬃcients are unchanged with respect to the previous specification. According to this
table, oﬀshoring is correlated with an increase in the skill-premium. Indeed oﬀshoring is
significantly correlated with an increase of the wage of workers with a college degree and
with a decrease of the wage of workers with only a high-school degree. However, it is still
not true that the coeﬃcient on oﬀshoring increases with skill. In particular, oﬀshoring has
a negative but weakly significant correlation with the wage of workers with less than a high-
school degree. Moreover, this correlation appears to be smaller, in absolute value, than the
correlation between oﬀshoring and the wage of high-school degree workers. The pattern of
the coeﬃcients on SBTC is similar to the pattern in the previous table with the diﬀerence
that now all the coeﬃcients for SBTC are significant.
The average (lagged) oﬀshoring increased 4 percentage points in this period. Given
that the wage is in logarithms, this increase in oﬀshoring is correlated with a 3.6% (that is,
0.04 times 0.90) increase in the wage of college degree workers and a −4% (that is, −1.00
times 0.04) change in the wage of high-school degree workers. Therefore, according to this
table, if one were to take a causal interpretation of the coeﬃcients, oﬀshoring increased the
college premium, relative to high-school, by 7.6 percentage points during the 80s. Given
that the college premium, relative to high-school, increased by 13 percentage points during
this period (see Section III.3), oﬀshoring can explain up to 58% of this increase. For the sake
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of comparison, FH find that, depending on the specification, oﬀshoring can explain between
15% and 40% of the increase in the wage premium of non-production workers relatively to
production workers during the same period. As we will see in the next section, my large
estimate is not robust to other specifications.
I also reestimate the previous regressions without including the demographic con-
trols. This allows me to determine how the exclusion of demographic variables aﬀects the
estimate of the eﬀect of oﬀshoring on the skill-premium. The results are in Table 6. The
coeﬃcient on oﬀshoring for workers with a college degree is still highly significant but it
is now more than two times larger than in the regression with demographic controls. The
coeﬃcient on workers with a high-school degree is still negative and significant. Using sim-
ilar calculations to the above, a 4% increase in oﬀshoring can now explain up to 90% of
the increase in the college wage premium. This table suggests that, when studying the
eﬀect of oﬀshoring on the skill-premium, the omission of the demographic variables inflates
the estimate of oﬀshoring. This result will be confirmed even when I use an industry-level
regression, as opposed to an individual-level regression.
Wages: Industry-Level Regressions
In all the results reported so far, I have used an individual level regression and
clustered the standard errors at the industry level. However, the clustered standard errors
may be unreliable when the number of clusters is small.40 This may be a concern for my
case given that I have only 19 clusters, i.e. 19 industries. Bertrand et al. (2004) simulate
the behavior of the cluster-adjusted standard errors as the number of clusters vary. They
find that with 20 clusters the probability of rejecting the null at the 5% level, when the
40See Angrist and Pischke (2009, p.319).
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null is true, is 5.8%.41 Their result suggests that the number of clusters in my dataset is
not a big concern. However, Bertrand et al. (2004) do not work with an individual level
regression as the one in (III.9). They first aggregate individual data within clusters in each
year and then run their simulations on these aggregate data.42 In order to use the Bertrand
et al. (2004)’s result, I must also run a regression that aggregates individual data within
industry-year pairs.
For each education category g, I then study this regression:
Sgjt =λ2 + φ1Xgjt + β1Oj,t−1 + β2Techj,t−1 + β3TFPj,t−1+
+ φ2Sg,j,1979 + β10Oj,1979 + β20Techj,1979 + δlngdpt−1 + ηjt (III.10)
where Sgjt is the average log wage of individual workers in industry j at time t in education
category g, λ2 is a constant, Xgjt is a vector of demographic characteristics (a female
dummy, a race dummy and experience), averaged across individual workers in industry j at
time t in education category g. Oj,t−1, Techj,t−1 and TFPj,t−1 are, respectively, oﬀshoring,
the log of the real price of investment and the log of total factor productivity of industry j
at time t− 1, Sg,j,1979 is the average log wage of individual workers in industry j in 1979 in
education category g, and Oj,1979 and Techj,1979 are, respectively, oﬀshoring and the log of
the real price of investment of industry j in 1979, lngdpt−1 is the log of GDP at time t− 1
and ηjt is an error assumed to be randomly distributed.
Notice how in the above regression the unit of observation is now an industry-year
pair. I do not use industry and year dummies because of the collinearity problem reported
above. I follow the same strategy as in Table 5 and so I use the log of GDP and initial
41See Bertrand et al. (2004, Table VIII, p.272). In their simulations this probability is very similar whether
one uses 20 clusters or 50 clusters, which is the number of clusters they recommend. Bertrand et al. (2004)
run their simulations on wage data from the March CPS and so their result is especially useful for my case.
42Bertrand et al. (2004) cluster data at the state level rather than at the industry level but their results
can be applied to the industry-level clustering as well.
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values of the key variables in order to control for the possible endogeneity of oﬀshoring and
SBTC.
The weights for each industry-year are computed as follows. First, before aggre-
gating the individual data at the industry-year level, I multiply, for each worker, the March
CPS weight by the total number of hours worked during the year.43 Then, for each educa-
tion category, I sum the obtained figures at the industry-year level and use those as weights
in the industry-year regression.44 I cluster the standard errors at the industry level.
The results for this specification are shown in Table 7 and Table 8.45 It is useful to
compare these coeﬃcients on oﬀshoring with the ones from the individual level regressions
(Table 5): in the industry level regression, the coeﬃcient on oﬀshoring for high-school degree
is smaller in absolute value and less significant; the coeﬃcient on oﬀshoring for workers with
some college is larger in absolute value and now more significant; the coeﬃcient on oﬀshoring
for workers with a college degree is smaller in absolute value and no more significant. The
lack of statistical significance on some estimates could be partly attributed to the smaller
sample size of the grouped regressions with respect to the individual ones. However, the
coeﬃcients on SBTC are very similar in magnitude and significance in both specifications
and so sample size does not seem to be a concern.
Overall, the eﬀect of oﬀshoring on the college skill premium is much smaller when
one uses data that is grouped at the industry level rather than individual workers’ data as in
43The total number of hours worked by a worker during the year is obtained by multiplying the number
of weeks he worked during the year times the average number of hours he worked per week.
44The results are robust to use as weights, for each education category, just the number of workers in that
category in a given industry-year pair.
45Table 7 and 8. Regressions by education category, one observation per industry-year. The dependent
variable is the average log of real hourly wage, computed using individual level data aggregated at the
industry-year-education level. Table 8 reports the coeﬃcients on the average, at the industry-year-education
level, of, respectively, the female dummy, the white race dummy, and experience. The regressions do not
include year and industry dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. March CPS sampling
weights multiplied by number of hours worked last year are used. Source: March CPS, NBER trade and
manufacturing data.
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Section III.4.1. If we use the estimates of the oﬀshoring coeﬃcients, whether significant or
not, a 4% increase in oﬀshoring is now associated with a −3.2% change in the wage of high-
school degree and with a 1.5% increase in the wage of college degree workers. Therefore,
according to this table, oﬀshoring can explain up to 36% of the 13% increase in the college
(relative to high-school) wage premium.
I also reestimate the model (III.10) omitting the demographic variables Xgjt. The
results are in Table 9.46 The eﬀect of oﬀshoring on the wage of workers with a high-
school degree is now less significant but the eﬀect of oﬀshoring on the wage of workers
with a college degree is much larger and now highly significant. If we ignore the eﬀect of
oﬀshoring on high-school degree workers (because its coeﬃcient is only weakly significantly
diﬀerent from zero), then a 4% increase in oﬀshoring explains 50% of the increase in the
college (relative to high-school) wage premium. If one instead assumes the coeﬃcient on
oﬀshoring for high-school degree workers to be equal to its estimate, i.e. -0.71, then a 4%
increase in oﬀshoring explains 72% of the increase in the college (relative to high-school)
wage premium. Therefore, also for the industry-level regressions, when the demographic
variables are omitted, oﬀshoring has a much higher eﬀect on the skill-premium.
Interestingly, the results in Table 9 are qualitatively similar to the results in FH
(p. 933, Table V). They use an industry-level regression, do not control for demographics
characteristics and find that oﬀshoring aﬀects significantly the wage of non-production
workers but barely aﬀects the wage of production workers.47 My results suggest that the
46Table 9 continued. Regressions by education category, one observation per industry-year. The dependent
variable is the average log of real hourly wage, computed using individual level data aggregated at the
industry-year-education level. The regressions do not include demographic variables, year and industry
dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. March CPS sampling weights multiplied by
number of hours worked last year are used. Source: March CPS, NBER trade and manufacturing data.
47Their dataset does not have data on the education of workers and so, following Berman et al. (1994)
they use non-production workers as a proxy of skilled workers and production workers as a proxy of skilled
workers.
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omission of demographic controls in their regression may have biased their estimates of the
eﬀect of oﬀshoring on the skill-premium.
In Table 8, in the regression for workers with a college degree, we see that the
average experience and the female share have significant coeﬃcients. Given that omitting
these controls aﬀects the coeﬃcient on oﬀshoring, this regression reveals that oﬀshoring is
correlated with an increase in the average experience of skilled workers and with a decrease
in the female employment share of skilled workers. Omitting these controls inflates the esti-
mates of oﬀshoring because experienced workers earn on average more and female workers
earn on average less.48
It is possible that an increase in oﬀshoring in one industry may not only aﬀect the
relative demand for skill in that industry, as the model in Section III.2 suggests, but also
induce a change in other demographics characteristics of the labor force of that industry.
If so, then the coeﬃcients on oﬀshoring in Table 9 may be biased, with the sign of the
bias depending on how oﬀshoring aﬀects the demographic composition of the labor force.
The point of this section is that, in order to determine the eﬀect of oﬀshoring on the skill-
premium, we need to account for the interaction between oﬀshoring and other demographic
characteristics of the labor force because such interactions are empirically important.
48The coeﬃcient on average experience is in line with the simple correlation analysis of Section III.3.
However, the pattern for the female share and white share is diﬀerent, with the regression analysis overturning
the results found with simple correlations. The diﬀerence is due to the fact that the regression analysis also
controls for other confounding factors which simple correlations do not account for.
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Employment
In order to study employment, for each education category g, I use the following
regression:
Hgjt =λ3 + χ1Xgjt + θ1Oj,t−1 + θ2Techj,t−1 + θ3TFPj,t−1+
+ χ2Hg,j,1979 + θ10Oj,1979 + θ20Techj,1979 + ξlngdpt−1 + ejt (III.11)
whereHgjt is (the log of) the total number of hours worked in industry j at time t by workers
of education g, Hg,j,1979 is the (the log of) the total number of hours worked in industry j in
1979 by workers of education g andXgjt, Oj,t−1, Techj,t−1, TFPj,t−1, Oj,1979, Techj,1979 and
lngdpt−1 are defined as in equation (III.10).49 In this regression the unit of observation is
an industry-year pair. The main hypothesis is that the higher the skill (i.e. the educational
achievement), the higher the coeﬃcient on oﬀshoring. In other words, oﬀshoring increases
the employment of skilled workers relatively to the employment of unskilled workers.
The results for model (III.11) are contained in Table 10. According to this table,
oﬀshoring has a significant and negative eﬀect on workers with less than a high-school degree
and on workers with only a high-school degree. The coeﬃcient on oﬀshoring for workers
with some college and workers with a college degree are also negative, even if they are not
significant. The coeﬃcient on oﬀshoring for workers with a college degree appears to be
less negative than the coeﬃcient on oﬀshoring for less skilled workers. In this sense, this
table suggests that oﬀshoring has bid up the relative demand for skilled labor. As to SBTC,
even if its coeﬃcients appear to be monotonic in skill, only the coeﬃcient for workers with
less than a high-school degree is significant at the 5% level. These results are virtually
49To compute Hgjt I first compute the total number of hours worked last year by each individual worker
by multiplying his average hours worked per week times his total weeks worked during the year. Then I sum
the obtained figures at the industry-year-education level and then take the log.
62
unaﬀected when running the same regressions without the demographic controls or using
year dummies instead of log of GDP.
As above, consider an increase in oﬀshoring by 4 percentage points, which is the
average change in oﬀshoring since 1979 to 1990. Taking a causal interpretation of the
regressions, this increase in oﬀshoring will reduce total hours worked by high-school degree
workers by about 21%, a very large eﬀect. The coeﬃcient on oﬀshoring for college degree
workers is not significant. If one nonetheless takes the magnitude of the coeﬃcient seriously,
a 4 percentage change in oﬀshoring decreases total hours worked by college degree workers
by 13%. Therefore, oﬀshoring increases the employment of college degree workers, relative
to the employment of high-school degree workers, by at least 8%. Given that this relative
employment increased by 40 percentage points since 1979 to 1990, oﬀshoring can explain
at least 20% of such increase.
In Section III.4.2 we found that the coeﬃcients on oﬀshoring did not increase
monotonically with skill. This may cast some doubts on the hypothesis that oﬀshoring
increases the skill-premium. As mentioned in Section III.2.1, however, if workers can easily
move across sectors, then, for each type of skill, the wage diﬀerential across sectors will
be arbitraged away. For this reason a wage regression that uses industry-level variation in
oﬀshoring will find only a small eﬀect of oﬀshoring on the skill-premium even if such eﬀect
is actually important. The large eﬀect of oﬀshoring on relative employment indeed suggests
that oﬀshoring has played a significative role in increasing the economy-wide skill-premium
by increasing the economy-wide relative demand for skilled workers.
Conclusion
In this paper I use individual workers’ data to study the eﬀect of oﬀshoring on the
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relative demand for skilled labor in U.S. during the 80s. In this way I am able to bring new
evidence on the still open question of the relationship between international trade and wage
inequality. Diﬀerently from the previous literature, my dataset also allows me to control
for demographic changes of the labor force within industries.
Utilizing a simple model I derive an equation that linearly relates the skill-premium
to oﬀshoring. I first show that it is important to control for demographic characteristics
of the labor force. When these controls are omitted, oﬀshoring explains at least 50% of
the increase in the skill-premium. Instead, when demographic controls are included, the
eﬀect of oﬀshoring on the skill-premium markedly decreases in all specifications. This
result highlights the importance of accounting for the interaction between oﬀshoring and
the demographic composition of the labor force when studying the eﬀects of oﬀshoring on
the skill-premium. I also find that, the higher the increase in oﬀshoring in an industry, the
higher its increase in the relative employment of skilled labor. This suggests that, at least
for U.S. in the 80s, oﬀshoring played an important role in the increase of the economy-wide
relative demand for skilled labor.
Data Appendix
Industry Level Data
For the construction of the industry-level variables, I follow FH while I follow
Ebenstein et al. (2009) for the proxy of SBTC. I obtain data on the sijt terms in equation
(III.8) from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) input-output tables. “The Indus-
try Benchmark Division (IBD) prepares benchmark input-output (I-O) accounts for years
ending in 2 and 7, which are based on detailed data from the quinquennial economic cen-
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suses that are conducted by the Bureau of the Census. [...] The benchmark accounts show
how industries interact at the detailed level; specifically, they show how approximately 500
industries provide input to, and use output from, each other to produce gross domestic
product”.50
I use the BEA I-O tables for 1982 and 1987. I keep only manufacturing industries
as both buyers and suppliers of inputs. These tables contain data for 368 industries in 1982
and 361 industries in 1987. For each industry these tables tell how much industry i spends
on each industry j for its inputs.51
I obtain the variables to compute import penetration (the MitYit+Mit−Xit term) in
equation (III.8) from the NBER manufacturing trade dataset.52 These data contain infor-
mation on 450 manufacturing industries for the 1958-1994 period (I will use only data for
the 1979-1990 period). The dataset is described in Feenstra and NBER (1996).
The industry identification code used in the BEA data is the Census one. This code
is diﬀerent from the SIC identification code that is used in the trade data. Moreover, the
trade dataset contains information on 450 manufacturing industries while the BEA dataset
contains information on a fewer number of manufacturing industries. I use the crosswalks
provided by the BEA in 1982 and 1987 to aggregate the trade data at the level of the BEA
data53. If industry A and B are aggregated in a single industry C, I compute the imports
50See the BEA website.
51This information is contained in the use variable of the Direct Requirement Coeﬃcients tables, that are
available for download on the BEA website.
52This data is available at Robert Feenstra’s website and on the NBER website. In theory this measure of
import penetration can be larger than 1: algebraically, given that Yit+Mit−Xit is always larger than zero,
this will occur if Xit > Yit. In my dataset, this happens to industry 3339 in the SIC 1972 code (Miscellaneous
primary nonferrous metal refiners and smelting) in years 1979, 1980 and 1981 and to industry 3915 in the
SIC 1987 code (Jewelers Findings and Materials and Lapidary Work) for years 1988 and 1989. I trim the
import penetration ratio to 1 in this case.
53The trade data is coded using the SIC 1972 code. For the 1982 input-output table, the BEA provides a
crosswalk with the SIC 1977, that is however very similar to the SIC 1972. For the 1987 input-output table,
the BEA provides a crosswalk with the SIC 1987, that is instead quite diﬀerent from the SIC 1972. I use
the conversion tables between SIC 1972 and SIC 1987 to transform the SIC 1972 trade data into the SIC
1987 classification. The conversion tables are available on the NBER website.
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(exports, domestic shipments) for C as the sum of imports (exports, domestic shipments)
of A and B54.
I then compute the input shares sijt, excluding Petroleum refining from the indus-
tries supplying inputs.55 I now have the input shares for 1982 and 1987. My imputation
of the input shares for other years is as follows. I assume that the input shares in the
1979-1984 period are equal to the input shares in 1982 and that the input shares in the
1985-1990 period are equal to the input shares in 1987. I now have the input shares for
the 1979-1990 period. I then merge the BEA data with the aggregated trade data. Now
I have all the terms for computing the measure of oﬀshoring for the 1979-1990 period for
each manufacturing industry.
The oﬀshoring data is not yet ready for use. Indeed, I use March CPS information
on the industry of a worker only at the two digits level. So we need to aggregate the
oﬀshoring data at the March CPS level. I first compute, for each year, the level of oﬀshoring
for each disaggregated industry and then take a weighted mean of this variable: in this way
I obtain the level, in that year, of oﬀshoring for the more aggregated, March CPS-level,
industries.56 I use as weights the share of the wage bill of the disaggregated industries in
the more aggregated industries. So, for example, if I aggregate the oﬀshoring of A and B
in year t, the weight on the oﬀshoring of A will be the wagebillA/(wagebillA + wagebillB)
in year t. I have now the level of oﬀshoring for each March CPS industry. The average
oﬀshoring 57 for an industry in my dataset is 10.3% that is very similar to the one of FH
(Table II, p. 923).58
54I do the same for other NBER variables such as capital and wage bill. I take instead a simple mean of
the investment price deflator.
55In this I follow FH that exclude energy purchases from the computation of the input shares.
56I use the variable indly2 of the March CPS Unicon dataset to identify a two-digits March CPS industry.
57This is computed as follows: keep one observation per March CPS industry-year. Compute oﬀshoring
for each industry and year. The average of this variable is 10%.
58The relevant statistic is the average for broad outsourcing in the 1979-1990 period, which is 9.67% in
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For SBTC, I use the log of the industry investment price deflator for each indus-
try minus the log of the personal consumption index for the current year. Data on the
investment deflator comes from the NBER manufacturing dataset. This variable can be
interpreted as the (log of the) real price of investment. In the appendix of a previous draft
of this paper I describe how I computed the proxies for SBTC used by FH. I was not able
to replicate the values of their variables and so I ended up not using these variables as a
proxy for SBTC.
Worker Level Data
The worker individual level’s data are from the March CPS survey. The March
CPS randomly samples addresses in U.S.: residents at a certain address are interviewed for
four consecutive months; then they are not interviewed for eight months; then again for
four months.59 The March CPS questionnaire has a specific supplement devoted to labor
questions: for this reason it has been extensively used in labor studies. I use the March
CPS data as processed by the Unicon Research Corporation.
Importantly, the data on income refers to the previous calendar year: so, if a
worker is interviewed in the March of year t, he will report his total wage and salary income
for year t-1. Given that I use data from the March CPS 1980 to the March CPS 1991, this
gives me data for income for the 1979-1990 period.
I mainly work with workers in the manufacturing sector. In the 1979-1990 period,
20% workers work in manufacturing60. I restrict the March CPS sample as follows.61 I use
FH.
59See Madrian (2000) and Liu and Trefler (2008).
60This is the fraction of workers in manufacturing out of the individuals in the CPS who are between the
age of 18 and 65 (see below) and report a positive income from wage and salary.
61These steps are very similar to those followed by Acemoglu (2002, p.64-65) who in turn follows Katz
and Autor (1999).
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only workers between the age of 18 and 65 (during their earnings years).
I also keep only workers whose class of employment is either private or government
in both years.62 I also keep only workers who have only wage income as opposed to self-
employment income and non-farm income63. The rationale for the two above criteria is the
following. Suppose that a worker works in a certain year for 40 weeks in a manufacturing
job and for 10 weeks as self-employed. We have data on his wage income (i.e. the one from
the manufacturing job) and on his self-employment income. However, we do not have his
weeks worked last year disaggregated by job. For this reason, when computing his weekly
manufacturing wage, we cannot divide his wage income by the recorded weeks worked. The
two criteria aim at addressing this problem by keeping only workers who have only a wage
income.64
I compute the hourly wage as follows. I multiply by 1.5 the topcode of yearly
income, then divide it by the average number of weeks worked last year and by average
number of hours worked last year. I do not use workers with allocated earnings or who
earned less than $67 per week in 1982 dollars (equal to one-half of the 1982 real minimum
wage based on a 40 hour week).
I define the various skill categories using years of education.65 The first category
is composed by those workers who did not get a high-school degree, i.e. workers who have
completed less than 12 grades. Workers with a high-school degree are defined as those
who completed exactly 12 years of school. The category of workers with some College is
62This is the variable clslyr in the Unicon dataset. The main classes of employment of a worker are
private, government and self-employed.
63In terms of the Unicon variables, this amounts to keep a record only if incern equals incwag.
64Notice that the first criterion is not suﬃcient. A worker may be categorized as not self-employed and
yet have some self-employment income. In some cases this additional income is of the same magnitude of the
salaried income. The second criterion is, empirically, not suﬃcient either: there are 89 workers who report
a wage income but whose class of employment is neither private nor government.
65I use the variable edu created in the algorithm described in Madrian (2000). This variable is very similar
to the educ variable in the Unicon dataset.
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composed by those workers who completed at least 13 years of school but less than 16.
The workers in the last category, i.e. college degree and above, have completed at least 16
years of school. Job experience is defined as age minus years of schooling minus seven and
negative values are set to zero. I use the March supplemental person weights throughout.
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Figure 4. Oﬀshoring and Skill-biased Technological Change in U.S. Manufacturing: 1979-
1990
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Figure 5. White Workers’ Share of Employment in U.S. Manufacturing: 1979-1990
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Figure 6. Average Job Experience in U.S. Manufacturing: 1979-1990
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Figure 7. Female Workers’ Share of Employment in U.S. Manufacturing: 1979-1990
0.0
0
0.2
0
0.4
0
0.6
0
0.8
0
0.0
0
0.2
0
0.4
0
0.6
0
0.8
0
0.0
0
0.2
0
0.4
0
0.6
0
0.8
0
0.0
0
0.2
0
0.4
0
0.6
0
0.8
0
80 85 90
80 85 90 80 85 90 80 85 90 80 85 90
Food Textile Apparel Lumber Furniture
Paper Printing Chemicals Petroleum Rubber
Leather Stone Prim. Metal Fabr. Metal Ind. Machinery
Electronic Transp. Instruments Misc.
Fe
ma
le 
Em
pl.
 S
ha
re
Year of survey
Graphs by Sic Aggregated at CPS level
74
Table 4. Individual wage regressions by education category, with year and industry dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Less than High School HS Degree Some College College Degree
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Experience 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Experience square -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
White 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.16***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Female -0.29*** -0.34*** -0.29*** -0.27***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Lag oﬀshoring -0.42 -0.57 -1.06*** -0.09
(0.36) (0.35) (0.22) (0.38)
Lag log real price of investment -0.17 -0.39* -0.79*** -0.57**
(0.19) (0.20) (0.11) (0.24)
Lag log TFP industry 0.19 0.16 0.19* -0.08
(0.14) (0.10) (0.11) (0.14)
Observations 34241 64628 23109 19936
R2 0.33 0.38 0.33 0.29
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Regressions by education category. The dependent variable is the log of real hourly wage.
Standard errors clustered at the industry level.
All regressions also include year dummies and industry dummies. March CPS sampling weights times hours last year are used.
Source: March CPS, NBER trade data, NBER productivity database.
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Table 5. Individual wage regressions by education, without year and industry dummies, U.S. 1979-1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Less than HS HS Degree Some College College Degree
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Lag oﬀshoring -0.48* -1.00*** -0.81* 0.90***
(0.27) (0.33) (0.45) (0.22)
Lag Real price of investment (log) -0.26** -0.64*** -0.71*** -0.53***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16)
Lag Log TFP industry 0.34 0.46*** 0.49*** 0.06
(0.21) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16)
Lag oﬀshoring in 1979 0.21 0.96* 0.55 -1.88***
(0.38) (0.46) (0.52) (0.26)
Lag Log real price investment in 1979 0.73*** 1.02*** 1.13*** 0.96***
(0.21) (0.25) (0.19) (0.20)
Lag mean log wage in 1979 0.68*** 0.60*** 0.60*** 0.55***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05)
Lag log real GDP -0.32*** -0.42*** -0.38*** -0.38***
(0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10)
Observations 34241 64628 23109 19936
R2 0.31 0.36 0.34 0.28
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Regressions by education category. The dependent variable is the log of real hourly wage.
Standard errors clustered at the industry level.
The regressions also include a gender dummy, a white race dummy, experience and experience square.
The regressions do not include year and industry dummies. March CPS sampling weights times hours last year are used.
Source: March CPS, NBER trade and productivity dataset.
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Table 6. Individual wage regressions by education, no demographics, no year and industry dummies. U.S. 1979-1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Less than HS HS Degree Some College College Degree
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Lag oﬀshoring -0.12 -0.88** -0.72 2.04***
(0.38) (0.33) (0.69) (0.30)
Lag Real price of investment (log) -0.13 -0.67*** -0.65*** -0.23
(0.13) (0.14) (0.18) (0.20)
Lag Log TFP industry 0.19 0.43*** 0.53*** 0.15
(0.14) (0.12) (0.18) (0.20)
Lag oﬀshoring in 1979 0.06 1.04** 0.54 -2.62***
(0.39) (0.42) (0.71) (0.31)
Lag Log real price investment in 1979 0.35** 0.83*** 1.14*** 0.44**
(0.14) (0.21) (0.26) (0.19)
Lag mean log wage in 1979 0.97*** 0.92*** 0.88*** 0.72***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.12) (0.08)
Lag log real GDP -0.30** -0.32*** -0.18** -0.39***
(0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.13)
Observations 34241 64628 23109 19936
R2 0.19 0.15 0.07 0.07
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Regressions by education category. The dependent variable is the log of real hourly wage.
Standard errors clustered at the industry level.
The regressions do not include demographic variables, year and industry dummies.
March CPS sampling weights times hours last year are used.
Source: March CPS, NBER trade and productivity dataset.
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Table 7. Industry-level wage regressions by education, no year and industry dummies. U.S.
1979-1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Less than HS HS Degree Some College College
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Lag oﬀshoring -0.12 -0.81** -1.17** 0.38
(0.39) (0.31) (0.49) (0.30)
Lag Log Real price of inv. -0.25** -0.57*** -0.80*** -0.53***
(0.11) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16)
Lag Log TFP industry 0.21 0.37*** 0.35*** -0.08
(0.16) (0.10) (0.12) (0.15)
Lag oﬀshoring in 1979 -0.01 0.92** 0.79 -1.42***
(0.39) (0.41) (0.58) (0.31)
Lag Log Real Price inv. in 1979 0.40* 0.61** 1.29*** 1.11***
(0.21) (0.25) (0.25) (0.15)
Hourly wage for edlesshs in 1979 0.84***
(0.05)
Lag log real GDP -0.32*** -0.33*** -0.31** -0.20*
(0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11)
Hourly wage for edhs in 1979 0.80***
(0.07)
Hourly wage for edsomco in 1979 0.55***
(0.10)
Hourly wage for edcol in 1979 0.56***
(0.05)
Observations 227 228 228 228
R2 0.96 0.96 0.86 0.86
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 8. Industry-level wage regressions by education, no year and industry dummies. U.S.
1979-1990, continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Less than HS HS Degree Some College College Degree
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Average Experience 0.01*
(0.00)
Average White Share 0.01
(0.14)
Average Female Share -0.10**
(0.04)
Average Experience 0.01***
(0.00)
Average White Share 0.18
(0.15)
Average Female Share -0.11
(0.09)
Average Experience 0.02***
(0.00)
Average White Share 0.06
(0.15)
Average Female Share -0.40***
(0.12)
Average Experience 0.01***
(0.00)
Average White Share -0.19
(0.13)
Average Female Share -0.38***
(0.06)
Observations 227 228 228 228
R2 0.96 0.96 0.86 0.86
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 9. Industry-level wage regressions by education category without demographics. U.S. 1979-1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Less than HS HS Degree Some College College Degree
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Lag oﬀshoring 0.15 -0.71* -0.92 1.62***
(0.40) (0.37) (0.79) (0.38)
Lag Real price of investment (log) -0.21 -0.68*** -0.66*** -0.23
(0.14) (0.14) (0.22) (0.20)
Lag Log TFP industry 0.14 0.35*** 0.45** 0.04
(0.13) (0.10) (0.18) (0.23)
Lag oﬀshoring in 1979 -0.16 0.97* 0.73 -2.31***
(0.36) (0.47) (0.82) (0.40)
Lag Log real price investment in 1979 0.22 0.69*** 1.11*** 0.51**
(0.17) (0.21) (0.31) (0.21)
Hourly wage for edlesshs in 1979 0.97***
(0.03)
Lag log real GDP -0.33*** -0.32*** -0.12 -0.27*
(0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13)
Hourly wage for edhs in 1979 0.94***
(0.04)
Hourly wage for edsomco in 1979 0.92***
(0.13)
Hourly wage for edcol in 1979 0.79***
(0.09)
Observations 227 228 228 228
R2 0.95 0.95 0.78 0.81
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 10. Industry-level hours of employment regr. by education, no demog., no year and industry dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Less than High School HS Degree Some College College Degree
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Lag Oﬀshoring -4.28** -5.25*** -4.39 -3.27
(1.57) (0.89) (2.77) (2.04)
Lag Real price of investment (log) 1.72** 0.58 0.31 -1.47*
(0.60) (0.40) (0.53) (0.72)
Lag oﬀshoring, 1979 4.20* 3.07*** 4.14 0.78
(2.01) (0.85) (2.42) (1.83)
Lag log real price of investment, 1979 -1.37 0.35 0.85 5.50***
(0.79) (0.58) (1.66) (1.71)
Log hours, less than hs, 1979 1.08***
(0.06)
Lag log real GDP -0.10 0.78*** 1.10*** 0.78**
(0.26) (0.25) (0.34) (0.28)
Log hours, hs degree, 1979 0.99***
(0.04)
Log hours, some college, 1979 1.01***
(0.08)
Log hours, college or more, 1979 0.89***
(0.07)
Observations 227 228 228 228
R2 0.91 0.95 0.91 0.92
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
One observation per industry-year. The dependent variable is the log of total hours of employment in each industry-year.
Demographics controls added. No year and industry dummies are included. Standard errors clustered at the industry level.
Weights are as described in the text. Source: March CPS, NBER trade and productivity data.
81
CHAPTER IV
OFFSHORING AND OCCUPATIONAL SWITCH
Introduction
Various studies have stressed the importance of an increase in economic turbulence
for the understanding of the labor market. In a seminal study Gottschalk and Moﬃtt (1994)
decompose the change in the variance of the log of wages into the change of the variance of
a permanent component and the change of the variance of a transitory component. They
find that the variance of the transitory component of log wages increased by 40% from the
1970s to the 1980s in U.S.1 Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) observe that in the 1983-1995
period Europe faced a unemployment rate that was higher than the average for the OECD
countries. They attribute this fact to the interaction between the distorted incentives of the
european welfare states on workers’ labor supply and the increase in turbulence in the econ-
omy. However, the sources of the increase in turbulence are usually left unexplained.2 This
paper studies one of such possible sources, i.e. one form of “globalization”. In particular,
I study the impact of trade in intermediate inputs, oﬀshoring for short, on the probability
of switching occupation.
Kambourov and Manovskii (2009a) document that the fraction of workers switch-
ing occupations in the U.S. was as high as 16% a year in the early 1970s and had increased
to 21% by the mid-1990s. Kambourov and Manovskii (2009a) also find “substantial returns
1They also find that the variance of the permanent component increased by the same amount in that
period. See Katz and Autor (1999, p. 1495).
2See Katz and Autor (1999, p. 1497).
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to tenure in an occupation - an increase in wages of at least 12% after five years of occupa-
tional experience, holding other observables constant.” Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b,
p. 733) then argue that “the observable increase in occupational mobility is one possible
manifestation of the increased turbulence”. Motivated by this insight I use the probability
of switching occupation as dependent variable in my empirical models.
The studies of the impact of oﬀshoring on the labor market have tended to fo-
cus on how oﬀshoring aﬀects the skill-premium. This link has been the object of several
theoretical and empirical studies. However, there are only few empirical studies that try
to determine whether oﬀshoring aﬀects the variance of the transitory component of wages
or not. Given that oﬀshoring reallocates the production process across diﬀerent countries,
oﬀshoring possibly involves a certain amount of “creative destruction”. Oﬀshoring in man-
ufacturing from U.S. to abroad grew substantially between 1970 and 1990 (Hummels et al.
(2001)).3 For this reason, oﬀshoring seems a good candidate as a source of turbulence in
the labor market.
I use data from the March Current Population Survey (March CPS hereafter)
for the 1983-1990 period. This dataset is a large random sample of U.S. addresses and it
has been extensively used to document the evolution over time of the U.S. wage structure.
Some manufacturing workers are surveyed in two consecutive years and this allows me to
determine whether the worker has switched occupation or not from one year to the other.
I merge this individual level data with trade data that is at the industry level. Following
Ebenstein et al. (2009) I construct a measure of occupational oﬀshoring, i.e. a measure of
how much a certain occupations is exposed to oﬀshoring from abroad. I then regress the
probability of switching occupation on occupational oﬀshoring and other controls.
3Hummels et al. (2001) find that oﬀshoring in manufacturing from U.S. to abroad grew by more than
25% during this period. My measures of oﬀshoring also increase during this period. They are described in
section IV.3.2.
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Contrary to the hypothesis, I find that oﬀshoring does not increase the probability
of switching occupation. The coeﬃcient on oﬀshoring is either non-significantly diﬀerent
from zero or significantly diﬀerent from zero and negative. This result is robust to the use of
diﬀerent measures of oﬀshoring and to controlling for attrition out of the March CPS from
one year to the other. This result suggests that oﬀshoring from U.S. to abroad, at least for
the 1983-1990 period, has not been responsible for the increase in wage variability.
Section IV.2 reviews the literature, section IV.3 describes the dataset and the
empirical model, section IV.4 presents the results and section IV.5 concludes.
Literature Review
The works that are closest to mine are Liu and Trefler (2008), Ebenstein et al.
(2009) and Krishna and Senses (2009). They all study the impact of various measures of
openness on labor market outcomes in U.S. making use of individual level data on workers.
Liu and Trefler (2008) use the March CPS data for 1996-2005 and find that oﬀshoring of
services does not aﬀect the probability of switching occupations. My result echoes theirs
in that I also find that the oﬀshoring of manufacturing does not aﬀect the probability of
switching occupations.
Ebenstein et al. (2009) use the CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups and con-
struct a measure of occupational oﬀshoring. They find that, if an occupation is exposed to
oﬀshoring to low-income (high-income) countries, then the U.S. workers in that occupation
experience a decline (increase) in wages. Ebenstein et al. (2009) do not study however
how workers react to the oﬀshoring shock. If in response to it, the workers leave their
occupation, then they lose the human capital that is specific to their occupation. Kam-
bourov and Manovskii (2009a) document that the returns to tenure in an occupation are
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substantial. Therefore, this paper complements Ebenstein et al. (2009) by looking at an
additional channel through which occupational oﬀshoring may aﬀect wages. Moreover, my
paper complements their work by using a more inclusive measure of oﬀshoring, as discussed
in Tempesti (2011). In section IV.4 I discuss more in detail how my empirical results relate
to their findings.
Krishna and Senses (2009) studies the impact of international trade on labor mar-
ket risk in U.S.. While the motivation of their work and mine is very similar, there remain
some diﬀerences. First, they use as dependent variable a measure of income risk aggre-
gated at the industry level while I use the probability of switching occupation. While their
measure is a more direct measure of wage turbulence, my regressions shed light on a par-
ticular channel through which trade may aﬀect wage turbulence, i.e. through the loss of
occupation-specific human capital. Second, as independent variable they use import pene-
tration at the industry level whereas I use oﬀshoring at the occupational level. Both forms
of openness may aﬀect wage turbulence and so my work complement theirs in this regard.
Third, I focus on the 1980s while they focus on the 1990s and early 2000s.
In Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b) the increase in occupational switch is linked
to the increase in residual inequality, i.e. the wage inequality that is unaccounted by
experience, gender and race.4 They use a model with occupation-specific human capital
and parametrize turbulence as the variance of the productive shocks to occupations. They
calibrate this model and find that an increase in the variance of the productive shocks
to occupations can explain almost all of the increase in residual wage inequality.5 In their
4Katz and Autor (1999, p. 1468 and p. 1477-1478) document that “wage dispersion increased substan-
tially for both men and women from the end of the 1970s to the mid 1990s” and that wage diﬀerentials
distinguished by sex, education, and age/experience account “for only one third of overall wage variation
so that changes in wage dispersion within these groups are likely to be an important part of changes in the
overall wage inequality.”
5The log of wage wst for individual s at time t can be decomposed as follows:
ln(wst) = βtXst + λtαs + ηst
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model, all the occupations are identical and face the same variance of the productive shocks.
In my regression the identification comes from the fact that diﬀerent occupations are exposed
to diﬀerent oﬀshoring shocks and so in this regard my regressions cannot be considered a
direct test of their model.
Data and Empirical Model
Worker-Level Data
My sample is obtained by merging a dataset that contains information at the
individual worker’s level and other datasets that contain information at the level of the
industry the worker is in. I obtain individual worker’s data from the March CPS that
were collected between 1983 and 1991. Each survey contains data for the previous calendar
year and so I work with data for the 1982-1990 period. As explained below, due to survey
limitations I cannot use data that refer to year 1984.
The March CPS has been extensively used in labor economics to document the
increase in residual inequality.6 Even though the March CPS is not conceived as a panel,
where Xst is a vector that contains sex, race, education, age and possibly their interactions, βt is the possibly
time-varying price associated to these characteristics. An increase in the variance of βtXst increases the
wage inequality between workers’ categories (e.g. skilled vs. unskilled workers). The αs terms capture
the permanent individual productivity that is not observable to the statistician (e.g. eﬀort) whereas λt is
the possibly time-varying price associated to such productivity. An increase in the variance of λtαs + ηst
increases the wage inequality within workers’ categories. This inequality is also called residual inequality.
The explanation for the increase in residual inequality are of two types. Some focus on the increase in the
variance of the return λt to individual fixed eﬀects αs. According to these theories, workers are already
heterogeneous ex-ante. Other theories, such as the one in Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b), ignore the
αs terms and their prices and focus instead on the increase in the variance of the time-varying error term
ηst. According to these theories, workers are homogeneous ex-ante but heterogeneous ex-post because of the
shocks.
6See e.g. Katz et al. (2005) and Acemoglu (2002). Lemieux (2006) argues that the MORG CPS and
the March CPS diﬀer as to residual inequality and that the latter overstates the true extent of residual
inequality with the former dataset being more accurate. However, Figure 2 in Katz et al. (2005, p. 303)
graphs residual inequality over time in both the March CPS and the MORG CPS. From the figure we can
see that residual inequality does not diﬀer much across the two datasets during the 1980s. In any event, I
do not use the March CPS to measure residual inequality. I use it to study how oﬀshoring relates to the
probability of switching occupations.
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some workers will be in the survey in two consecutive years if, as explained in the appendix,
they do not change their residence address from one year to the other.
I keep only workers who are in a manufacturing industry in the first year that
they appear in the sample. So, they need not be in manufacturing in the second year that
they are in the sample. It is not possible to match workers who appear in the survey for
the first time in March 1985 and so I do not use those workers. I use Madrian (2000)’s
algorithm to match individuals across CPS surveys. According to this algorithm, 67% of
the manufacturing workers have a valid match.
I construct a variable that assumes a value of 1 if the worker changes her/his
three-digit occupations in the second year s/he is in the survey and 0 otherwise.7 I keep
only workers who are employed in both years that they are in the survey. So, I ignore the
flow in and out of unemployment and in and out of the labor force.
This measure of occupational mobility is noisy.8 I use a similar filter to the one
proposed in Moscarini and Thomsson (2007) to reduce the number of invalid occupational
switches.9 In particular, I consider a switch of occupation valid only if at least one of the
three following conditions is satisfied: a) the worker changes her class of employment; b)
the workers switches industry; c) last year the worker worked at least one week year but at
most 49 weeks and s/he looked for a job.10
After this filter is applied, out of the workers who are matched across years and
are of 19-65 years old at the time of the survey, 27% switch occupation at the three-digit
level. Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) use the PSID data and find that during the 1968-
1997 period occupational mobility increased from 16% to 20% at the three-digit level. My
7I use the variable occlyr in the Unicon dataset.
8See Moscarini and Thomsson (2007) and Kambourov and Manovskii (2004).
9See Liu and Trefler (2008) for a similar approach.
10I use the variable class1 for class of employment; indly2 for industry aﬃliation; wkslyr for weeks worked
last year and lkedpy for looked for a job last year.
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measure of mobility is higher and this could be partly due to the fact that the measure of
occupational mobility in the CPS is noisier. This noise will be absorbed by the residual
of my regression. As long as the error in the measurement of occupational mobility is
not correlated with the regressors, the regression will generate unbiased estimates of the
coeﬃcients.11 Table 11 contains the descriptive statistics.
Industry-Level Data
I construct two measures of oﬀshoring at the occupational level. Following Feenstra
and Hanson (1999), I define oﬀshoring IndOﬀjt at the industry level as:
IndOﬀjt =
￿
i
(pitqijt)
Mit
Yit+Mit−Xit￿
i
pitqijt
(IV.1)
where, at time t, pit is the price of the final good from sector i, qijt is the input quantity
that the manufacturing industry j buys from the manufacturing industry i, Yit, Mit and
Xit are respectively domestic shipments, imports and exports of industry i and the indexes
i and j vary only over manufacturing industries. Notice that in the input-output tables we
do not observe pit and qijt independently but only their product pitqijt. Given that
￿
i
pitqijt
is the total (manufacturing) cost of production for the final good j, then we can rewrite
(IV.1) as:
IndOﬀjt =
￿
i
(sijt)
Mit
Yit +Mit −Xit (IV.2)
where sijt is the share of (manufacturing) expenditures of sector j on input i at time t
and the second term of the product is a measure of import penetration. The measure of
industrial oﬀshoring is then an average, with the expenditures shares as weights, of numbers
that vary between 0 and 1. Therefore the measure of industrial oﬀshoring varies between 0
11See Liu and Trefler (2008, p.11) for this point.
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and 1 and can be thought as the share of imported intermediate inputs for a given industry.
I obtain data on the sijt terms from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) input-output
tables and the variables to compute import penetration from the NBER manufacturing
trade dataset. I compute industrial oﬀshoring at the more disaggregated Census industry
level and then average oﬀshoring within CPS two-digits industries. I end up with oﬀshoring
data for 20 two-digits industries. The Appendix contains additional details.
I then compute a measure of occupational oﬀshoring. Define Lij82 and Li82 as,
respectively, the number of workers who are in occupation i and industry j in 1982 and
the total number of workers who are in occupation i in 1982. Define then αijt to be the
fraction of workers in occupation i who are in industry j in year t. I set αijt equal to
Lij82
Li82
. I set the weights in any year equal to the weights in 1982 because these weights may
be endogenous with respect to oﬀshoring. In constructing these weights I use all workers
in 1982, not just those who have a valid match in the next survey. I have a total of 316
three-digits occupations and 46 two-digits occupations.
Following Ebenstein et al. (2009), I define OccOﬀit, a measure of occupational
oﬀshoring for occupation i in year t, as following:
OccOﬀit =
#Industries￿
j=1
αijtIndOﬀjt (IV.3)
So, I obtain a measure of how much each occupation is exposed to oﬀshoring in
manufacturing. I do not study the increase of oﬀshoring in services, which seems to be a
relatively more recent phenomenon.12 This measure has an average value of 9% in 1982
and 12% in 1989.
I compute analogously a measure of skill-biased technological change (SBTC hence-
12See Amiti et al. (2005) and Amiti and Wei (2009). Liu and Trefler (2008) and Crino` (2010) study the
eﬀects of oﬀshoring of services on the U.S. labor market.
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forth) at the occupational level. As a measure of SBTC at the industry level I use the deflator
of industry investment divided by the personal consumption expenditure index. This is then
the real price of investment in a certain industry in terms of current consumption. I use
this proxy for SBTC under the assumption that, as the real price of investment decreases,
SBTC will increase.13 As above, I then average this variable at the occupational level using
the αijt weights. The final measure has an average value of -0.07 in 1982 and 0.06 in 1989.
I also compute another measure of occupational oﬀshoring using intermediate man-
ufacturing imports as a measure of industrial oﬀshoring. Define vsjt andmpjt as the nominal
value of total shipments, respectively, the nominal value of parts that are imported, by a
certain industry j at time t. This alternative measure of industrial oﬀshoring is:
IndOﬀPartsjt =
mpjt
vsjt +mpjt
(IV.4)
The data on the nominal value of shipments is from the NBER productivity dataset (Bar-
telsman and Gray (1996)). The imported parts data is available on Peter Schott’s website.14
Intermediate imports are defined here to be the sum of product-level U.S. imports that con-
tain variants of the word “part”. This variable is constructed using TSUSA import codes
for 1972-1988 and HS import codes for 1989-2001. This change in the construction of the
variable produces a break in the evolution of this variable over time. For this reason, when
I use this variable, I do not use data on workers who appear in the data for the first time
in the March CPS 1990. This measure is at the SIC 1987 four-digit level. I first aggregate
this variable at the CPS two-digit level using as weights the employment share at the in-
dustry level. I obtain data on employment at the SIC 1987 four-digit level from the NBER
productivity dataset. As above, I then average this variable at the occupational level using
13See Ebenstein et al. (2009).
14See Peter Schott’s website and Schott (2004). Kosteas (2008) also uses this variable to study the eﬀect
of oﬀshoring on wages.
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the αijt weights. The final measure has an average value of 2% in 1982 and 4% in 1988.
Empirical Model
The main regression I study has this form:
Switchst(s) = α+ βOccOﬀi(s),t(s)−1 + γOccPinvi(s),t(s)−1+
+δXs,t(s)−1 + λi(s) + λj(s) + λt(s) + ￿st(s) (IV.5)
where s varies over workers, t(s) is the second year for which we have data about worker s,
i(s) (j(s)) is the occupation (industry) in which worker s is in year t(s) − 1, Switchst(s) is
equal to 1 if the worker switches occupation between year t(s)−1 and t(s) and 0 otherwise,
OccOﬀi(s),t(s)−1 is occupational oﬀshoring, OccPinvi(s),t(s)−1 is occupational SBTC,Xs,t(s)−1
is a vector of individual characteristics of worker s in year t(s)− 1, λi(s) is a vector of two-
digits occupation dummies, λj(s) is a vector of two-digits industry dummies, λt(s) is a vector
of year dummies and ￿st(s) is an error, that is assumed to be exogenous to the regressors.
An example may help. Suppose a worker’s occupation in his longest job held during
1983 is technician: we have this information from the CPS survey that is collected in the
March of 1984. We study the probability that this worker’s occupation, in his longest job
held during 1984, is diﬀerent from technician. We regress this probability on the oﬀshoring
of technician services, as constructed above, in 1983.
I use a linear probability model in order not to impose any distributional assump-
tions on the probability of switching occupation. The year dummies control for the fact
that occupational switch may be systematically higher in some years rather than others,
maybe because of macroeconomic eﬀects that aﬀect all workers. The occupation (indus-
try) dummies control for the fact that occupational switch may be systematically higher in
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some occupations (industries) rather than others.15 I use two-digit occupation and industry
dummies. I cluster the standard errors at the two-digit occupation level to account for the
potential correlation of the residuals for workers who are in the same two-digit occupation,
even if in diﬀerent years.16
Results
Table (12) contains the results for the regression of occupational switch at the
three-digit level on the measure of occupational oﬀshoring constructed using the measure of
industrial oﬀshoring in Feenstra and Hanson (1999), a measure of SBTC at the occupational
level, demographic variables, year dummies, two-digits industry and occupation fixed eﬀects.
Relative to the omitted category of being non-black and non-white, a white (black)
person seems to have a lower (higher) probability of switching occupation. However these
coeﬃcients are not precisely estimated. Women switch occupations more frequently. The
probability of switching occupation decreases in a convex manner in potential job experi-
ence.17 More educated people also switch occupation less frequently. The higher occupa-
tional SBTC (proxied by the inverse of the real price of investment), the lower the occu-
pational switch. However, this coeﬃcient is not precisely estimated because occupational
SBTC appears to be highly collinear with the other regressors.18
The coeﬃcient on occupational oﬀshoring is negative and significant at the 10%
level. This suggests that workers who are in occupations that are exposed to oﬀshoring are
less likely to switch their occupations. This can happen because oﬀshoring allows to import
15See Wooldridge (2002, p. 272-274) for this estimation strategy.
16See Bertrand et al. (2004).
17Potential job experience is defined as age minus years of schooling minus six: negative values are set to
zero. So, this is not actual job experience or tenure in the currently held job or occupation.
18I have rerun the same regression omitting the occupational SBTC measure. The results are unchanged
except for the fact that the coeﬃcient on occupational oﬀshoring is slightly less precisely estimated.
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inputs that are complementary rather than substitutes to domestic inputs. Occupational
oﬀshoring increased from 9% to 12% during the 1982-1989 period. So, this coeﬃcient
suggests that the probability of switching occupations decreased approximately by 13%.19
It is helpful to compare this result to the results in Ebenstein et al. (2009). For
each occupation, they construct a measure of the employment abroad in aﬃliates of U.S.
multinationals that is potentially substitute or complement of the U.S. workers in that
occupation. They are also able to distinguish employment abroad in low-income countries
vs. employment abroad in high-income countries. They find that the higher the occupation-
specific employment in aﬃliates in low, respectively high, income countries, the lower,
respectively the higher, the wage of U.S. workers in that occupation. In other words, workers
in U.S. multinationals’ aﬃliates in low-income countries are substitute of U.S. workers
whereas workers in U.S. multinationals’ aﬃliates in high-income countries are complement
of U.S. workers. My measure of oﬀshoring does not distinguish between oﬀshoring to low
and high income countries and so its coeﬃcient can be interpreted as the net eﬀect of the
two types of oﬀshoring. Overall, therefore, at least for this period, oﬀshoring does not seem
to increase the probability of switching occupation. In this regression, oﬀshoring is actually
correlated with a decrease in the probability of switching occupation. This eﬀect however
becomes non significantly diﬀerent from zero in other specifications studied below. In this
sense, the substitution and complementarity eﬀects of the two types of oﬀshoring cancel out
each other.
The CPS samples residences and not individuals and so it is possible that a worker
who is sampled one year is not sampled in the next year because she changes residence. I
am able to match only 67% of the workers, across the two consecutive March CPS surveys
19I have rerun the above regression using a Probit model instead of a linear probability model. The
marginal eﬀect of occupational oﬀshoring, evaluated at the means for all the other regressors, has the same
magnitude and significance as the coeﬃcient from the linear probability model.
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in which they may appear. It is possible that selective attrition biases the estimates in the
above regression.This may happen if e.g. a worker whose occupation is hit by an oﬀshoring
shock leaves her current residence because of the shock. In order to control for attrition, I
run the linear probability model with the correction from the Heckman’s two step estimator
using the command heckman twostep in Stata. This command adjusts the standard errors
on the model estimates if the inverse Mills ratio is significantly diﬀerent from zero. On the
other hand, this command does not allow the use of weights and the clustering of standard
errors.20
I include in the selection equation all the regressors in equation (IV.5) plus the
following: number of members of the family, number of children below the age of 6 years, a
house ownership dummy, a dummy to indicate whether the respondent changed residence
with respect to last year, a married dummy.21
Table 14 contains the results for the selection equation. Except for number of
children below 6 years, all excluded regressors are highly predictive of the probability of
being in the sample. Instead, occupational oﬀshoring does not aﬀect such probability.
Relative to the omitted category of being non-black and non-white, both white and black
persons are more likely to be in the sample as are more experienced and more educated
individuals.
Table 13 contains the results for the linear probability model when corrected using
the Heckman two-step estimator. The inverse Mills ratio is highly significant. However,
the coeﬃcient and significance on the individual level variables do not change much with
respect to the uncorrected model of table 12. The coeﬃcient on occupational oﬀshoring is
20I have also tried to use the Heckman maximum-likelihood estimator, which requires more stringent
assumptions than the two-step estimator but that is more eﬃcient if these assumptions hold. However,
the Heckman maximum-likelihood estimator did not converge because of a failure of the concavity of the
log-likelihood function.
21See Liu and Trefler (2008) for a similar approach to model selection in this context.
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instead smaller in absolute value and less significant.
Table 15 contains the results for the regression of occupational switch at the three-
digit level on the measure of occupational oﬀshoring constructed using the imported parts
data described in Schott (2004), a measure of SBTC at the occupational level, demographic
variables, year dummies, two-digits industry and occupation fixed eﬀects. The magnitude
and significance of the coeﬃcients on the demographic variables is very similar to the ones
in table 12. However, now the coeﬃcient on occupational oﬀshoring is not only much
less precisely estimated but also much smaller in magnitude. Occupational oﬀshoring of
parts increased 2 percentage points during this period: multiplying this number by the
corresponding coeﬃcient, occupational oﬀshoring of parts appears to have decreased the
probability of switching occupation by .01 percentage points.22
In order to control for sample attrition I run the two-step Heckman estimator.
Table 16 contains the results for the selection equation. The results are very similar to
the ones in Table 14. Table 17 contains the results for the linear probability model when
corrected for sample attrition. The coeﬃcient and significance on the individual level vari-
ables are not aﬀected by the correction. The coeﬃcient on occupational oﬀshoring remains
imprecisely estimated but it is now positive, even if very small in magnitude.
Conclusion
Using data from the March CPS from the 1983-1990 period, I study if oﬀshoring
in manufacturing is correlated with occupational switch. I find that oﬀshoring does not
increase the probability of switching occupation. The coeﬃcient on oﬀshoring is either non-
22I have rerun the above regression using a Probit model instead of a linear probability model. The
marginal eﬀect of occupational oﬀshoring, evaluated at the means for all the other regressors, is -.056.
Again, multiplying this number by 2 percentage points, occupational oﬀshoring of parts appears to have
decreased the probability of switching occupation still by .01 percentage points. This marginal eﬀect is also
still highly imprecisely estimated.
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significantly diﬀerent from zero or significantly diﬀerent from zero and negative. This result
is robust to the use of diﬀerent measures of oﬀshoring and to controlling for attrition out of
the March CPS from one year to the other. This result suggests that oﬀshoring from U.S.
to abroad has not been responsible for the increase in wage variability.
Data Appendix
Worker Level Data
The worker individual level’s data are from the March CPS survey.23 The CPS
randomly samples addresses in U.S.: residents at a certain address are interviewed for
four consecutive months; then they are not interviewed for eight months; then again for
four months.24 Each month some addresses exit the interview group (after their eighth
interview) and other addresses enter the interview group. The March questionnaire has a
specific supplement devoted to labor questions: for this reason it has been extensively used
in labor studies. I use the CPS data as processed by the Unicon Research Corporation.
The CPS is not conceived as a panel. However, if an individual does not change
the address where he is living, he is interviewed more than once over time. In particular, if
he is in the sample during two consecutive March surveys, then we may have data to take
the diﬀerences needed in our estimating equation. There are however many reasons why
the across-years match of individuals may be less than 100%. These are migration, death,
non-response and recording errors.
As to the latter, as argued in Madrian (2000), in the 1980s the CPS did not use
23These are the wsjt and Xst terms and the index j, i.e. the industry to which a worker belongs.
24The discussion in this section follows closely Madrian (2000) who devised an algorithm to merge diﬀerent
March CPS surveys. I also follow Liu and Trefler (2008) that use Madrian (2000)’s algorithm.
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a completely reliable person-identifier for the diﬀerent months. For this reason the match
is prone to error. A way to reduce the error is to validate the match using demographic
variables: for example, if the data of two diﬀerent years are referring to the same individual,
sex should not usually change across years.
We would like to maximize the number of good matches (i.e. matching data that
really belong to the same individual) while at the same time minimizing the number of
bad matches (i.e. not matching data that do not belong to the same individual). Madrian
(2000) experiment with various validation methods based on demographic variables and
find that there is a trade-oﬀ between the above goals. She recommends using the S R A
algorithm as able to provide a good balance among the two competing goals. According to
this algorithm, the data for two consecutive years are first matched using the household and
person identifiers. Then a match is considered invalid if: i) gender diﬀers; ii) race diﬀers; or
iii) the diﬀerence in age between t and t+1 is less than -1 or greater than 3. I use the S R A
algorithm as well. According to this algorithm, 67% of the workers have a valid match.25
Potential job experience is defined as age minus years of schooling minus six:
negative values are set to zero. I use the March supplemental person weights throughout.
Industry Level Data
For the construction of the industry-level variables, I follow Feenstra and Hanson
(1999) while I follow Ebenstein et al. (2009) for the proxy of SBTC. I obtain data on the
sijt terms in equation (IV.2) from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) input-output
tables. “The Industry Benchmark Division (IBD) prepares benchmark input-output (I-O)
accounts for years ending in 2 and 7, which are based on detailed data from the quinquennial
25Out of the workers who potentially have a match i.e. the workers who potentially are in the survey in
two consecutive years.
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economic censuses that are conducted by the Bureau of the Census. [...] The benchmark
accounts show how industries interact at the detailed level; specifically, they show how
approximately 500 industries provide input to, and use output from, each other to produce
gross domestic product”.26
I use the BEA I-O tables for 1982 and 1987. I keep only manufacturing industries
as both buyers and suppliers of inputs. These tables contain data for 368 industries in 1982
and 361 industries in 1987. For each industry these tables tell how much industry i spends
on each industry j for its inputs.27
I obtain the variables to compute import penetration (the MitYit+Mit−Xit term) in
equation (IV.2) from the NBER manufacturing trade dataset.28 These data contain infor-
mation on 450 manufacturing industries for the 1958-1994 period (I will use only data for
the 1979-1990 period). The dataset is described in Feenstra and NBER (1996).
The industry identification code used in the BEA data is the Census one. This code
is diﬀerent from the SIC identification code that is used in the trade data. Moreover, the
trade dataset contains information on 450 manufacturing industries while the BEA dataset
contains information on a fewer number of manufacturing industries. I use the crosswalks
provided by the BEA in 1982 and 1987 to aggregate the trade data at the level of the BEA
data29. If industry A and B are aggregated in a single industry C, I compute the imports
26See the BEA website.
27This information is contained in the use variable of the Direct Requirement Coeﬃcients tables, that are
available for download on the BEA website.
28This data is available at Robert Feenstra’s website and on the NBER website. In theory this measure of
import penetration can be larger than 1: algebraically, given that Yit+Mit−Xit is always larger than zero,
this will occur if Xit > Yit. In my dataset, this happens to industry 3339 in the SIC 1972 code (Miscellaneous
primary nonferrous metal refiners and smelting) in years 1979, 1980 and 1981 and to industry 3915 in the
SIC 1987 code (Jewelers Findings and Materials and Lapidary Work) for years 1988 and 1989. I trim the
import penetration ratio to 1 in this case.
29The trade data is coded using the SIC 1972 code. For the 1982 input-output table, the BEA provides a
crosswalk with the SIC 1977, that is however very similar to the SIC 1972. For the 1987 input-output table,
the BEA provides a crosswalk with the SIC 1987, that is instead quite diﬀerent from the SIC 1972. I use
the conversion tables between SIC 1972 and SIC 1987 to transform the SIC 1972 trade data into the SIC
1987 classification. The conversion tables are available at the NBER website
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(exports, domestic shipments) for C as the sum of imports (exports, domestic shipments)
of A and B.
I then compute the input shares sijt, excluding Petroleum refining from the indus-
tries supplying inputs.30 I now have the input shares for 1982 and 1987. My imputation
of the input shares for other years is as follows. I assume that the input shares in the
1979-1984 period are equal to the input shares in 1982 and that the input shares in the
1985-1990 period are equal to the input shares in 1987. I now have the input shares for
the 1979-1990 period. I then merge the BEA data with the aggregated trade data. Now
I have all the terms for computing the measure of oﬀshoring for the 1979-1990 period for
each manufacturing industry.
The oﬀshoring data is not yet ready for use. Indeed, I use March CPS information
on the industry of a worker only at the two digits level. So we need to aggregate the
oﬀshoring data at the March CPS level. I first compute, for each year, the level of oﬀshoring
for each disaggregated industry and then take a weighted mean of this variable: in this way
I obtain the level, in that year, of oﬀshoring for the more aggregated, March CPS-level,
industries.31 I use as weights the share of the wage bill of the disaggregated industries in
the more aggregated industries. So, for example, if I aggregate the oﬀshoring of A and B
in year t, the weight on the oﬀshoring of A will be the wagebillA/(wagebillA + wagebillB)
in year t. I have now the level of oﬀshoring for each March CPS industry. The average
oﬀshoring 32 for an industry in my dataset is 10.3% that is very similar to the one of Feenstra
and Hanson (1999) (Table II, p. 923).33
30In this I follow Feenstra and Hanson (1999) that exclude energy purchases from the computation of the
input shares.
31I use the variable indly2 of the March CPS Unicon dataset to identify a two-digits March CPS industry.
32This is computed as follows: keep one observation per March CPS industry-year. Compute oﬀshoring
for each industry and year. The average of this variable is 10%.
33The relevant statistic is the average for broad outsourcing in the 1979-1990 period, which is 9.67% in
Feenstra and Hanson (1999).
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For SBTC, I use the log of the industry investment price deflator for each indus-
try minus the log of the personal consumption index for the current year. Data on the
investment deflator comes from the NBER manufacturing dataset. This variable can be
interpreted as the (log of the) real price of investment. In the appendix of a previous draft
of this paper I describe how I computed the proxies for SBTC used by Feenstra and Hanson
(1999). I was not able to replicate the values of their variables and so I ended up not using
these variables as a proxy for SBTC.
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Table 11. Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Female 0.33 0.47 0 1
White 0.89 0.32 0 1
Black 0.08 0.28 0 1
Age 40 11.64 19 65
Job Experience 21.5 12.3 0 58
Years of Education 12.5 2.73 0 19
Switch 3-digit Occupation 0.27 0.44 0 1
Married 0.73 0.44 0 1
Weeks worked last year 47.97 9.83 1 52
Occupational Oﬀsh. 3-digits, Feenstra-Hanson 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.22
Occupational Oﬀsh. parts 3-digits 0.03 0.02 0 0.14
Occupational SBTC 3-digits -0.02 0.05 -0.14 0.07
N 31857
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Table 12. Switch of Occupation Regression
(1)
Switch 3-digit Occupation
b/se
Occupational Oﬀsh. three dig., fixed wgt -0.440*
(0.259)
Occupational Price of Invest. three dig., fixed wgt 0.306
(0.324)
Female 0.019**
(0.008)
White -0.013
(0.016)
Black 0.026
(0.023)
Experience -0.011***
(0.001)
Experience Squared 0.000***
(0.000)
Years of Education -0.003*
(0.002)
Observations 31857
R2 0.041
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The dependent variable is occupational switch at the three-digit level. Standard errors clustered at the two-digit occupation level.
The regression also includes year dummies and two-digit occupation and industry dummies. March CPS sampling weights are used.
Source: March CPS 1983-1990 (year 1985 excluded, see text), NBER productivity data, BEA I-O tables.
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Table 13. Switch of Occupation Regression, corrected for attrition
(1)
Switch 3-digit Occupation
b/se
Switch 3-digit Occupation
Occupational Oﬀsh. three dig., fixed wgt -0.260
(0.179)
Occupational Price of Invest. three dig., fixed wgt 0.258
(0.230)
Female 0.021***
(0.006)
White -0.008
(0.015)
Black 0.022
(0.017)
Experience -0.008***
(0.001)
Experience Squared 0.000***
(0.000)
Years of Education 0.000
(0.001)
mills
lambda 0.134***
(0.014)
Observations 47381
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The dependent variable is occupational switch at the three-digit level. There are 15524 censored observations.
All regressions also include year dummies and two-digit occupation and industry dummies. The Heckman two-step estimator is used to model attrition.
Source: March CPS 1983-1990 (year 1985 excluded, see text), NBER productivity data, BEA I-O tables.
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Table 14. Switch of Occupation Regression, continued. Attrition Model
(1)
Switch 3-digit Occupation
b/se
Number of persons in family -0.027***
(0.005)
Num of kids in fam under 6 0.007
(0.012)
Owns the house? 0.696***
(0.015)
Mover at t-1? -0.267***
(0.017)
Married 0.221***
(0.016)
Occupational Oﬀsh. three dig., fixed wgt 0.511
(0.443)
Occupational Price of Invest. three dig., fixed wgt -0.556
(0.578)
Female 0.021
(0.016)
White 0.102***
(0.035)
Black 0.233***
(0.041)
Experience 0.028***
(0.002)
Experience Squared -0.000***
(0.000)
Years of Education 0.043***
(0.003)
Observations 47381
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
First step of the two-step Heckman estimator to control for attrition.
The dependent variable is occupational switch at the three-digit level.
The regression also includes year dummies and two-digit occupation and industry dummies.
The Heckman two-step estimator is used to model attrition. 15524 censored observations.
Source: March CPS 1983-1990 (year 1985 excluded, see text), NBER productivity data, BEA I-O tables.
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Table 15. Switch of Occupation Regression on Imported Parts
(1)
Switch 3-digit Occupation
b/se
Occupational Oﬀshoring Parts, three dig. fixed weights -0.035
(0.229)
Occupational Price of Invest. three dig., fixed wgt 0.289
(0.322)
Female 0.016*
(0.008)
White -0.011
(0.018)
Black 0.029
(0.026)
Experience -0.012***
(0.001)
Experience Squared 0.000***
(0.000)
Years of Education -0.003
(0.002)
Observations 27293
R2 0.038
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The dependent variable is occupational switch at the three-digit level. Standard errors clustered at the two-digit occupation level.
The regression also includes year dummies and two-digit occupation and industry dummies. March CPS sampling weights are used.
Source: March CPS 1983-1989 (year 1985 excluded), Schott’s imported parts measure as detailed in text.
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Table 16. Switch of Occupation Regression, Attrition Model
(1)
Switch 3-digit Occupation
b/se
select
Number of persons in family -0.025***
(0.005)
Num of kids in fam under 6 0.006
(0.013)
Owns the house? 0.689***
(0.016)
Mover at t-1? -0.258***
(0.018)
Married 0.219***
(0.017)
Occupational Oﬀshoring Parts, three dig. fixed weights 0.058
(0.432)
Occupational Price of Invest. three dig., fixed wgt -0.211
(0.631)
Female 0.019
(0.017)
White 0.118***
(0.038)
Black 0.232***
(0.044)
Experience 0.028***
(0.002)
Experience Squared -0.000***
(0.000)
Years of Education 0.043***
(0.003)
Observations 40565
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The dependent variable is occupational switch at the three-digit level.
The regression also includes year dummies and two-digit occupation and industry dummies.
The Heckman two-step estimator is used to model attrition. 13272 censored observations.
Source: March CPS 1983-1989 (year 1985 excluded, see text), NBER productivity data, Schott(2004) data.
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Table 17. Switch of Occupation Regression on Imported Parts, corrected for attrition
(1)
Switch 3-digit Occupation
b/se
Switch 3-digit Occupation
Occupational Oﬀshoring Parts, three dig. fixed weights 0.082
(0.171)
Occupational Price of Invest. three dig., fixed wgt 0.225
(0.249)
Female 0.017***
(0.007)
White -0.003
(0.017)
Black 0.028
(0.019)
Experience -0.009***
(0.001)
Experience Squared 0.000***
(0.000)
Years of Education 0.001
(0.001)
mills
lambda 0.137***
(0.015)
Observations 40565
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The dependent variable is occupational switch at the three-digit level.
The regression also includes year dummies and two-digit occupation and industry dummies. The Heckman two-step estimator is used to model attrition.
Source: March CPS 1983-1989 (year 1985 excluded, see text), NBER productivity data, Schott(2004) data.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The debate over the eﬀects of globalization remains lively. The first chapter of the
dissertation makes the point that the use of datasets that contain data on individual workers
holds the promise of advancing this debate. These datasets bridge the gap between the labor
literature and the trade literature. Indeed, they allow one to control for changes in the
demographic composition of the labor force across industries over time. They also allow the
study of some important labor market outcomes such as the probability of a worker changing
her occupation and thereby potentially losing her occupation specific human capital.
Because of this insight, in the second chapter I combine individual workers data
from the March Current Population Survey with industry level trade data and study the
eﬀects of oﬀshoring on the skill-premium. I show that industry-level wage regressions over-
estimate the impact of oﬀshoring on the skill-premium if the demographic characteristics of
the labor force are omitted. This result shows the importance of using datasets that contain
individual data on workers when studying the eﬀects of an economy’s internationalization.
In addition, I find that oﬀshoring increases the relative employment of skilled workers, thus
suggesting that oﬀshoring has played an important role in the increase in the skill-premium
by increasing the economy-wide relative demand of skilled workers.
In the third chapter, using data from the March Current Population Survey for
the 1983-1990 period, I study whether oﬀshoring in manufacturing is correlated with oc-
cupational switching. I find that oﬀshoring does not increase the probability of switching
occupations. The coeﬃcient on oﬀshoring is either non-significantly diﬀerent from zero or
significantly diﬀerent from zero and negative. This result suggests that oﬀshoring from U.S.
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to abroad has not been responsible for the increase in residual inequality. Taken together,
my results imply that, at least for U.S. in the 1980s, oﬀshoring increased wage inequality
by increasing the skill-premium but did not aﬀect residual wage inequality.
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